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NOAA's New Natural Resource Damage
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Collecting Money
James S. Seevers, Jr.
On Friday, January 19, 1996, a Providence-bound barge carrying four
million gallons of household heating oil ran aground off Moonstone Beach,
Rhode Island, after its tug boat burst into flames.I The barge, The North
Cape, spilled more than 828,000 gallons of oil into Block Island Sound.'
One Boston reporter noted that "[t]he worst oil spill in Rhode Island history
couldn't have struck at a more pristine spot."3 Moonstone Beach and its
surrounding salt ponds and marshes are home to countless birds and abun-
dant sea life, including world-famous lobsters, scallops, clams, and floun-
der.4 Hundreds of thousands of lobsters washed ashore dead, hundreds of
birds died from consuming oil, countless clams and mussels died or were
severely contaminated, and government officials closed the beach and 250
square miles of fishing grounds.' The oil also defiled the habitat of the
piping plover, an endangered species.6
Federal, state, and local government workers converged on the Rhode
Island coast to contain the oil, begin the clean-up process, and assess the
extent of the injury I Eventually, the government officials will present a
natural resource damage claim to the barge's owner, Ecklof Marine.8 That
1. Matt Bai, Barge Lacked Critical Gear Spill Might Have Been Avoided, Official
Says, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 26, 1996, at 21.
2. Mark Mueller, Disaster Takes Devastating Toll on Area Wildlife, BOSTON HERALD,
Jan. 22, 1996, at 6.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Bai, supra note 1, at 21, Jules Crittenden, Bird's Recovery Heartens Volunteers,
BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 10, 1996, at 8; Peter Lord, Closed Fishing Grounds Still Not Safe,
PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Feb. 9, 1996, at 16A.
6. Mueller, supra note 2, at 6.
7 Id.
8. Peter Lord, North Cape Spill Vessel Fishes for Clues to Sound's Health, PROvI-
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claim will consist of the cost of assessing the damages, restoring the area
to its prespill condition, and compensating the public for its temporary loss
of this natural resource - not to mention the actual cost of removing the
oil. 9 Before the federal and state officials can present that claim, they must
determine precisely what these injured or destroyed natural resources are
worth to the people of New England. The National Oceamc and Atmo-
spheric Administration (NOAA) recently developed new procedures that
will change the way the government determines natural resource value and
compensates the public."° The oil spill in Rhode Island will be the first
natural resource injury assessed under NOAA's new approach. 1
L Overview
In the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA),12 Congress instructed NOAA
to promulgate regulations establishing procedures for assessing natural
resource damages resulting from the discharge of oil."3 After nearly five
years at the task, NOAA published a final rule on January 5, 1996 that
outlines the new natural resource damage assessment process (the Final
Rule). 4 For more than ten years, the Department of the Interior (DOI) has
also studied natural resource damages and developed similar regulations
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA). 5 NOAA's most recent regulations have benefit-
16ted from the collaboration and cumulative experience of the two agencies.
DENCE J.-BULL., Feb. 4, 1996, at 1A, Oil Spills: NOAA Natural Resource Damage Rule
Applied to North Cape Spill Case, Nat'l Env't Daily (BNA), Feb. 5, 1996, at 1 [hereinafter
North Cape Spill].
9 North Cape Spill, supra note 8, at 1.
10. Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 61 Fed. Reg. 440 (1996) (to be codified
at 15 C.F.R. § 990) [hereinafter Final Rule].
11. North Cape Spill, supra note 8, at 1. The natural resource trustees expect
damages to surpass the costs of cleanig up the oil. Id. Experts have estimated the cost of
federal government oversight alone in the first 15 days following the spill to be $3 million.
Id.
12. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1994)).
13. 33 U.S.C. § 2706(e)(1).
14. Final Rule, supra note 10.
15. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1994)). DOI published the first natural resource damage assessment final rule on August
1, 1986. Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 51 Fed. Reg. 27,674 (1986) (codified at,
43 C.F.R. §§ 11.10-.93 (1987)).
16. See Final Rule, supra note 10, at 462-63 (noting that NOAA benefitted from
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In the typical spill situation under the conventions of OPA or
CERCLA, federal, state, and Indian officials (appointed as public trustees
for natural resources) work with the parties responsible for injuring natural
resources to return those resources to their normal fumnctioning conditions.
In addition, the governing statute authorizes the trustees to collect damages
from the responsible parties for the interim and permanent loss of the
natural resources. A natural resource damage assessment is the administra-
tive procedure through which the natural resource trustees evaluate the
injuries to natural resources in order to arrive at appropriate damage fig-
ures. Trustees conceptualize natural resource damages in several ways, the
most obvious of which is the econolmc market value of the natural resource
and the animals dependent on that resource. In addition, to facilitate an
accurate determination of total value, trustees view the damage measure-
ments in terms of lost use and nonuse values.17 Use values represent the
measurable direct or indirect human benefit from the natural resource18 and
can be measured using market or indirect market methods. Nonuse values
represent a nonconsumptive value derived from a natural resource without
any direct physical or aesthetic use and include option, 19 existence,2 and
bequest values." Economists, ecologists, and regulators have struggled to
DOI's experience in writing natural resource damage assessment (NRDA) regulations under
CERCLA through DOI's involvement in interagency work group involved m developing
Final Rule).
17 See Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent Valuation Measurement
of Nonuse Values, in NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES: A LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLICY
ANALYSIS 61, 62-63 (Richard B. Stewart ed., 1995) (discussing history and definition of
nonuse values, as opposed to use values).
18. Id.
19. Option values generally represent the value of knowing a natural resource exists
without planned use - knowing one has the option to use the natural resource. See Carl
V Phillips & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Confronting Natural Resource Damages: The
Economist's Perspective, in NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES: A LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND
POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 17, at 119, 140-41 & n.32 (noting that if option value is real
future use, it should be treated as use value and if it is "merely wishful thinking about future
use," then it should be treated as pure existence value).
20. See Phillips & Zeckhauser, supra note 19, at 141 (defining pure existence value
as "benefits derived from just knowing a resource exists"); Jeffrey C. Dobbins, Note, The
Pam and Suffenng of Environmental Loss: Using Contingent Valuation to Estimate Nonuse
Damages, 43 DUKE L.J. 879, 901 (1994) (defining nonuse values). Dobbins explains the
concept of nonuse value and offers an example: "If no human were ever'permitted to access
or view a wilderness area, individuals might still place some value on the mere knowledge
that such a pristine area existed." Id.
21. See Phillips & Zeckhauser, supra note 19, at 140-48 (defining components of
nonuse values generally and discussing merits of including nonuse values in damages).
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develop an acceptable method to calculate the accurate total value of natural
resources. Common-law damage theory and previous damage assessment
rules under CERCLA and OPA focused on procedures to calculate dollar
figures representing (1) the cost to restore the natural resource to its normal
condition, (2) the diminution in value of the resource pending restoration,
or (3) both. One team of natural resource scholars described the general
damage assessment scheme prior to NOAA's latest contribution:
In large part because of its novel, hybrid character and its adoption of
liability principles going far beyond the common law, the current system
inevitably involves enormous transaction costs, profound factual and legal
uncertainty, and the persistent threat of arbitrary and potentially enor-
mous liabilities. These difficulties cannot be solved without fundamental
rethinking and restructuring.
NOAA's publication of the Final Rule is the latest of many fundamen-
tal rethikings and restructurings of natural resource damage policy " This
Final Rule marks the culmination of several years of study by NOAA,
including extensive communication with and input from the concerned
public.24 The result is a simplified damage assessment process that is
different m practice and m theory from previous damage assessment regula-
tions.' With a resurgent emphasis on restoration,' NOAA has sidelined
the previously preferred monetary valuation techniques in favor of a rela-
tively untested theory that is based on compensation for interim lost value
Bequest value exists in the indirect benefit that an individual derives from knowing that future
generations will enjoy a resource and thus directly benefit from it. Id. at 141.
22. Richard B. Stewart et al., Evaluating the Present Natural Resource Damages Regime:
The Lawyer's Perspective, in NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES: A LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND
POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 17, at 153, 156.
23. See Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 60 Fed. Reg. 39,804, 39,804 (1995)
(to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990) (proposed Aug. 3, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 Proposed Rule]
(referring to new approach as "fundamental restructuring of the rule to provide even greater
emphasis upon restoration").
24. See Final Rule, supra note 10, at 440 (listing 11 Federal Register notices requesting
information from public on approaches to developing natural resojirce damage assessment
procedures and 14 regional workshops and public meetings to discuss several drafts of
assessment procedures).
25. See Robert F Copple, NOAA's Latest Attempt at Natural Resource Damages
Regulation: Simpler But Better', 25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,671, 10,671 (Mar.
1995) (noting that NOAA's 1995 proposed rule "ostensibly focuses on the use of simplified
procedures").
26. Within this Note and in the natural resource damage discourse generally, "restora-
tion" refers to "restoring, rehabilitating, replacing, or acquiring the equivalent of, the damaged
natural resources." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (1994).
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in the form of compensatory natural resources - it's "not about collecting
money "I This restoration emphasis is apparent in the practical and con-
ceptual changes in the damage assessment process and represents a major
step in the larger progression of valuation theory with potential ramifica-
tions throughout environmental policy.
This Note outlines the Final Rule and presents an analysis of its new
methods for determining compensation to the public for injury to natural
resources. The focus is on evaluating NOAA's new approach from the
perspective of previous fundamental restructurings of natural resource
damage assessment schemes and the larger evolution of valuation theory
This Note places particular emphasis on the conceptual, controversial, and
constantly evolving methods of measuring and compensating for lost nonuse
values. Part II traces the development of compensation for natural resource
damages from common-law damage theory through the enactment of natural
resource damage legislation to the various attempts by DOI to promulgate
damage assessment regulations.' Part H closes with a discussion of the
first fundamental rethinking and restructuring of natural resource damage
assessments in Ohio v United States Department of the Interior 29 Part M
27 See Final Rule, supra note 10, at 482 (stating that "OPA is not about collecting
money"); itd. at 458 (listing public comment that new approach is untried theory). But see id.
(responding to comment and noting that new approach embodies methods used in some
successful and cooperative settlements).
28. See infra notes 35-145 (presenting evolution of NRDA legislation, regulation, and
theory).
29. 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In Ohio, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit considered a facial challenge to ten aspects of DOI's regulations by ten
states, three environmental organizations, the chemical industry, a manufacturing company,
and a utility company Id. at 438. Using the analysis of the validity of admirustrative
regulations established by the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837
(1984), the court first looked at each of the ten issues to determine if Congress had directly
spoken to the precise issue. Id. at 441. As to three of the ten issues, the court found that
Congress had expressed an intent regarding the issue and that the regulation did not reflect
congressional intent. Id. at 441-62. First, the court addressed a challenge to the regulation's
provision that damages for injury to natural resources should be the lesser of replacement costs
or diminution in use values. Id. at 441-59. The court concluded that Congress evidenced a
distinct preference for restoration costs as the measure of damages and thus held that DOI's
lesser-of rule was invalid. Id. at 459. Second, the court examnned the regulation's limit on
collection of natural resource damages for injuries to land owned by governments and re-
manded the record to the agency for a clarification of the regulation's application to lands not
publicly owned. Id. at 459-61. Third, the court scrutinized the regulation's "rigid hierarchy"
of assessment methods that included a preference for (1) the price commanded by the resource
on the open market, (2) the appraised value of the resource, and (3) the values derived with
alternative methods, in that order. Id. at 462. The court concluded that DOI's emphasis on
market values and the limited role for nonuse values was an unreasonable interpretation of
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discusses the enactment of OPA, OPA's natural resource damage provi-
sions, and NOAA's subsequent attempts to develop damage assessment
regulations. ° The final section of Part III presents the latest fundamental
rethinlng and restructuring, NOAA's 1996 Final Rule, outlines its new
procedure, and identifies its new concepts. 3' Part IV focuses on the Final
Rule's treatment of economic efficiency concerns, the emerging role for
nonuse values and contingent valuation, and the theoretical progression that
may explain the practical changes.32
The Final Rule is one more step in a progression of natural resource
damage assessment regulation that is indicative of the evolving debate con-
cerning environmental public goods and environmental policy m general.33
Part V concludes that we should applaud NOAA for developing regulations
that attempt to account for the variety of ways that people value natural
resources while avoiding the controversial issues that have plagued natural
resource damage assessments. In the short run, NOAA's preference for
trustee 'flexibility over certainty and predictability may inhibit efforts to
achieve economically efficient solutions. However, the ability to reduce
transaction costs, implement efficient damage assessments, and achieve
accurate compensation will come from experience and practical fine-tuning
of the assessment methods within the progressing theory I In the long run,
CERCLA. ld. at 463-64. The court examined and rejected the remaining seven challenges.
Id. at 438. In addition, the court considered the listing of contingent valuation, often referred
to as CV or CVM, as one of the alternative valuation methods and concluded that (1) it was
a "best available procedure" as required by CERCLA and (2) inclusion of CV in the regula-
tions was consistent with congressional intent. Id. at 474-78. See generally Raymond J. Kopp
et al., Natural Resource Damages: The Econonucs Have Shifted After Ohio v. United States
Department of the Interior, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,127 (Apr., 1990) [hereinaf-
ter Kopp et al. The Economics Have Shifted]; Erik D. Olson, Natural Resource Damages in
the Wake of the Ohio and Colorado Decisions: Where Do We Go From Here?, 19 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,551 (Dec. 1989). To the extent that the court m Ohio was simply
revealing the true meaning behind CERCLA, the case serves as a delayed recognition of the
fundamental restructuring that actually took place when Congress passed CERCLA.
30. See infra notes 146-73 and accompanying text (discussing enactment of OPA and
NOAA's early attempts at NRDA regulations).
31. See infra notes 174-227 and accompanying text (outlining new process m Final
Rule).
32. See infra notes 228-366 (discussing implications of Final Rule as it relates to three
areas: economic efficiency, use of contingent valuation to value nonuse values, and progression
of natural resource valuation theory and public policy).
33. See generally Brian Dickenson, We Cannot Afford Public Apathy About Environmen-
tal Problems, PROVIDENCE J.-BuLL., Feb. 7, 1996, at 7B (arguing that topics of debate in
environmental protection have changed and that public attention needs to adapt).
34. See Final Rule, supra note 10, at 440-41 (stating that due to increased public
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recognizing that economists do not have all the answers to the natural
resource valuation problems and further implementing the emerging theme
of social responsibility will help the government to create better environ-
mental policy Accounting for the diverse ways that people value natural
resources will promote a satisfactory balance between protecting the envi-
ronment and promoting commercial activity
IL The Evolution of Natural Resource Damage Assessment Theory
A. Common-Law Damage Theory and Economic Efficiency
In private actions at common law, the primary measure of damages for
harm to land is the difference between the value of the land before the harm
and the value of the land after the harm.3' Under this depreciation or
diminution-in-value measure, courts attempt to identify the decrease in a
hypothetical prospective purchaser's willingness to pay as a result of the
injury3 6 The hypothetical buyer will consider the long-term effects on the
land, including the possibility that the land will recover to its normal
condition. 7 A settled exception to the common-law norm provides that in
an appropriate case the property owner may elect to receive the cost of
restoring the land to its pre-mjury condition, instead of the diminution in
the property's value, as the measure of damages.38 This option is only
appropriate, however, when (1) the cost of returmng the land to its normal
condition is not disproportionate to the decrease in value of the land or
(2) the owner has a personal reason for restoring the land to its original
condition. Thus, when the owner demonstrates a sufficient personal
reason for restoration, courts will measure damages as the cost of restoring
the property to its original state even though this amount may exceed the
entire value of the land.4' In addition, the owner may recover damages for
participation m assessments, NOAA expects that trustees may achieve restoration quicker, with
fewer transaction costs, and with a decrease in the likelihood of litigation).
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929(i)(a) (1977).
36. See d. § 929(1)(a) cmt. a (noting that property loses present value due to impairment
of future use and that test is from vantage of "reasonable prospective purchaser").
37 See Hudson v. Peavey Oil Co., 566 P.2d 175, 179 (Or. 1977) (measuring permanent
damages for oil discharge from neighboring property as difference between value of injured
land and value of land without injury, from perspective of an interested buyer).
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929(1)(a) (1977).
39. See d. § 929(i)(a) cmt. b (noting that when cost of restoring land to its original
condition is disproportionate to diminution in value, damages are measured by difference in
value "unless there is a reason personal to the owner for restoring the original condition").
40. Id., see also Rector, Wardens & Vestry of St. Christopher's Episcopal Church v
C.S. McCrossan, Inc., 235 N.W.2d 609, 611 (Minn. 1975) (holding that measure of damages
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the loss of use of the property pending recovery "
The common-law approach to damages for injury to land is based on a
traditional view of social welfare economics. 42 Two components of economic
efficiency are relevant to this view- the maximization of social utility through
the proper allocation of resources and risk deterrence. 43 The first idea is
based on the theory that one person's actions can lower the welfare of the
unintended recipient of those actions thereby skewing the allocative mecha-
nisms of the market.' In order to correct those mechanisms and make the
Injured party whole, the actor should pay the lowest amount that makes the
plaintiff indifferent as to the choice between suffering the injury and recover-
ing damages, or having never experienced the injury I5 This "perfect com-
pensation" promotes the second efficiency concept - risk deterrence - by
encouraging rational actors to internalize risk.' Achieving both elements of
economic efficiency becomes increasingly difficult when the property owner
values the property in a manner not expressible in economic or market
terms.47 Courts cannot balance the putative benefits to the actor from the
for church trees destroyed by road contractor was replacement cost, instead of diminution
in value, because of unique aesthetic and practical value of trees); Denoyer v Lamb, 490
N.E.2d 615, 618-19 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (entitling owners of residential lots to cost of
restoring property to original condition for damages from trees recklessly cut down by
logger instead of market value of timber removed).
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929(I)(b) (1977).
42. See Douglas R. Williams, Valuing Natural Environments: Compensation, Market
Norms, and the Idea of Public Goods, 27 CONN. L. REv 365, 384, 386 (1995) (describing
common-law approach as having basis m traditional welfare economic principles).
43. See Phillips & Zeckhauser, supra note 19, at 119, 123-24 (explaining that key to
efficient liability is ensuring that polluters pay for all harm inflicted on others and establish-
ing price for pollution that is effective deterrent and thus leads to proper allocation of
resources).
44. See Williams, supra note 42, at 386-87 (noting common law's attempt to correct
breakdown in distributive and allocative mechanisms of market for public goods).
45. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 379-80 (1988)
(discussing efficiency applications of tort law, costs of tortfeasor's actions on levels of
utility, and perfect compensation in tort law context).
46. Id. A point of origination of modem economic principles of risk deterrence and
cost internalization is United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
In that case, Judge Learned Hand posited that a rational actor should take additional safety
precautions when the cost of those precautions is less than the probability of an injury
multiplied by the dollar amount of the typical injury Id. at 173. See generally COOTER &
ULEN, supra note 45, at 381 (discussing tort modes of economic efficiency).
47 See Phillips & Zeckhauser, supra note 19, at 124 (noting that lack of market
values for natural resources complicates calculation of damages and hinders goal of eco-
noric efficiency); Williams, supra note 42, at 386-87 (arguing that common-law framework
for protecting property fails to realize alternative nonmarket modes of value).
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activity against the decrease in personal or noneconomic utility to the land
owner. Thus, compensating in kind by returning the land to its pre-mjury
condition is a solution cognizant of the common law's inability to balance
economic and noneconomic values.' Restoration, as the exception to the
common-law dimmution-in-value rule, offers flexibility from the strict eco-
nomic cost rationale to account for intrinsic value.49 Thus, the goal of
accurate compensation overcomes economic efficiency when dealing with
non- or less-fungible goods."0
It is difficult to boil economic efficiency down to its core components,
and the above description of its role in the common-law approach to property
damages is simplified. In the natural resource context, the appropriate role
for or emphasis on economic efficiency is even more difficult to determine."'
Nonetheless, environmental economists have concentrated on aspects of
efficiency m the context of natural resource damage assessments. Thus, one
regulatory task has been the creation of a deterrent scheme for potential
polluters by providing a measure of damages based on weighing the costs of
an injury against the costs of avoiding the injury 52 The absence of a ready
market for many natural resources, however, impedes the realization of the
48. See Williams, supra note 42, at 386-88 (explaining that common-law courts
recognized inability of strict lesser-of rule to account for uniqueness of property outside of
market domain).
49. See Robert F Copple, The New Economic Efficiency in Natural Resource Damage
Assessments, 66 U. COLO. L. Rlv 675, 676-77 (1995) (describing restoration alternative
under Restatement as reasonable or approximate economic efficiency). Mr. Copple presents
a valuable analysis of the elements of economic efficiency m the Restatement and in NRDA
regulations from DOI's 1986 rule up to and including NOAA's January 1994 proposed rule.
Id. passim; see mfra notes 230-64 and accompanying text (evaluating elements of NOAA's
1996 Final Rule m light of traditional economic efficiency and Copple's "new economic
efficiency").
50. See Ohio v United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 456 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (stating that "fatal flaw" of DOI's common-law approach was that it applied efficiency
rationale associated with fungible goods); Williams, supra note 42, at 388 (noting that
purposes of common law are not achieved when values cannot be "commodified").
51. See generally Copple, supra note 49, at 676-77 (discussing common-law origin
of economic efficiency in natural resource damages law and undertaking task of determining
proper role for economic efficiency in natural resource damage assessments generally);
Heidi Wendel, Note, Restoration As the Economically Efficient Remedy for Damage to
Publicly Owned Natural Resources, 91 CoLuM. L. REV 430 (1991) (presenting law and
economics perspective of tort law efficiency as basis for arguing for restoration as most
efficient measure of damages).
52. See Phillips & Zeckhauser, supra note 19, at 121 (discussing use of liability levels
for achieving appropriate level of risk deterrence); id. at 123-25 (explaining that role of
natural resource damages in economy, like price, is to create incentives that lead to correct
allocation of resources).
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value that the public places on natural resources and thus hinders the creation
of a deterrent scheme.53 Second, policymakers must determine the proper
amount to spend on restoring an injured natural resource in light of the fact
that restoration cost is often unrelated to both the social utility of the re-
source and the amount necessary to deter risky behavior by potential pollut-
ers.54 Natural resource damage theory originated in a dissatisfaction with the
common-law damage scheme's inability to account for the true value of
natural resources.55 Considering both this common-law foundation and the
historical impediments to achieving economic efficiency facilitates an analysis
of the statutory natural resource damage provisions, the corresponding
regulations, and their supporting theories. Although policymakers have
modified the natural resource valuation practice and theory, modem valuation
is not completely distinct from its common-law origns.
5 6
B. Building on Common-Law Damage Theory"
Statutory Natural Resource Damages
In 1977, Congress passed amendments to the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act and expanded liability for oil spills and releases of hazardous
substances.57 The Clean Water Act of 1977 (CWA) codified a public trust
doctrine in which federal and state government officials act on behalf of the
public as trustees of natural resources.58 The trustees may recover damages
for injury to natural resources and must spend all recovered funds to restore
the prior level of social benefit from the resource.59 The CWA also instructs
the trustees to recover the cost of restoring the resource in addition to the
53. See id. (adding that efficiency may suffer when trustees do not base damages on
market value and that market value is appropriate mode to ensure adequate incentives).
54. See id. (noting that cost of restoration is not related to price that promotes proper
incentives).
55. See Commonwealth v S.S. Zoe Colocotrom, 628 F.2d 652, 673-74 (ist Cir.
1980) (discussing enactment of state and federal oil pollution legislation on natural resource
damages as response to limitations on recovery under common law), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
912 (1981).
56. See id. at 674 & n.21 (noting that prmcij~les applicable m natural resource damage
cases attempting to ascertain reasonable cost of restoration are "not so completely removed
from traditional valuation theory as might, at first blush, appear"); see generally Dobbins,
supra note 20 (comparing common-law tort damages for pam and suffering with nonuse
values for natural resource damages).
57 The Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1354 (1994)).
58. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(5).
59 See id. (providing that all damages recovered "shall be used to restore, rehabili-
tate, or acquire the equivalent of such natural resources by the appropriate agencies").
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basic clean-up costs.' The CWA first codified the idea that the responsible
parties should compensate the public for environmental damages above the
loss measured by market values.61 Thus, even the earliest statutory natural
resource damage provisions departed from strict common-law damage theory,
favored restoration as the measure of damages, and moved away from
economic efficiency based purely on economic loss.
In 1980, CERCLA extended liability for parties causing harm to natural
resources to include damages for all forms of injury to natural resources
resulting from the discharge of oil or the release of hazardous substances,
including the costs of assessing the injuries.62 In furthering the public trust
doctrine, Congress provided for the designation of federal and state trustees
authorized to pursue claims for such injuries to natural resources under both
the CWA and CERCLA. CERCLA also requires that the trustees spend the
damages collected on restoring the natural resource, but does not limit
damages to the cost of restoration. 64 Congress instructed the President, who
in turn delegated that authority to DOI, to promulgate regulations to lay out
the appropriate techiques for assessing damages' and specified that the
regulations should "identify the best available procedures to determine such
damages."'  Any damage assessment conducted in conformity with the
regulations would receive a rebuttable presumption of accuracy in a proceed-
ing to recover natural resource damages from a responsible party 67
In August 1986, over three years past the statutory deadline, DOI first
promulgated the damage assessment regulations mandated by CERCLA.6s
60. See id. § 1321(f(4) (stating that trustees are to recover costs of restoration or
replacement of natural resources damaged or destroyed due to discharge of oil or hazardous
substance).
61. See Commonwealth v S.S. Zoe Colocotrom, 628 F.2d 652, 673-74 (1st Cir.
1980) (discussing enactment of CWA and noting that Congress decided "it is desirable to
provide for environmental damages apart from the commercial loss, ordinarily measured by
a market value yardstick"), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981).
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (1994) (providing for recovery of "damages for
injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of
assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release").
63. Id. § 9607(t)(2).
64. See id. § 9607(f)(1) (noting that trustees must use damage recoveries "without
further appropriation, for use only to restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent of such
natural resources").
65. See id. § 9651(c)(1) (directing President to promulgate damage assessment regula-
tions).
66. Id. § 9651(c)(2).
67. Id. § 9607(f)(2)(C).
68. Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 51 Fed. Reg. 27,674 (1986) (codified at
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DOI based the damage measurement portion of the original DOI rule on a
strict adherence to the economic efficiency principles derived from the
common law 69 The rule mandated that the trustees select as the appropriate
measure of damages the "lesser of: restoration or replacement costs; or
diminution of use values as the measure of damages." 7I In justifying this
approach, DOI reasoned that it would be more rational to compensate the
public for their lost value from injury to the natural resource if the cost of
restoring the resource was greater than the total lost use value.7 Unlike the
pure common-law approach, DOI did not identify a sufficient justification
for selecting restoration when the diminution-in-value option was less
costly I The original DOI theory reflected a predetermination that it was
always economically inefficient to select a restoration option more costly
than the diminution in value, even if a justification akin to a "reason per-
sonal" to the owner under the common law might warrant selection of the
restoration altemative. 73
When restoration cost was less than the diminution in value, and thus
the proper measure of damages, DOI's 1986 rule operated somewhat like
modem damage assessment regulations. The 1986 rule offered the concept
43 C.F.R. pt. 11 (1987)). References herein to DOI's original regulations, the 1986 DOI
rule, or DOI's pre-Ohio regulations all refer to the NRDA regulations codified m the 1987
Code of Federal Regulations.
69. See Mansa J. Mazzotta et al., Natural Resource Damage Assessment: The Role of
Resource Restoration, 34 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 153, 155 (1994) (concluding that original DOI
rule was "based on the common law concept that compensation should make the injured
party whole m the least costly manner").
70. 43 C.F.R. § 11.35(b)(2) (1987).
71. See Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 50 Fed. Reg. 52,126, 52,141
(proposed Dec. 20, 1985) (discussing rationale for lesser-of approach). The DOI reasoned
that:
[i]f use value is higher than the cost of restoration or replacement, then it would
be more rational for society to be compensated for the cost to restore or replace
the lost resource than to be compensated for the lost use. Conversely, if restora-
tion or replacement costs are higher than the value of uses foregone, it is rational
for society to compensate individuals for their lost uses rather than the cost to
restore or replace the injured natural resource.
Id.
72. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing common law's selection of
restoration over depreciation when court finds that owner has appropriate personal reason
to select restoration).
73. See Williams, supra note 42, at 385-86 (noting that primary reason for DOT's
lesser-of rule was "simplistic appeal to principles of welfare economics"); id. at 395
(explaining premise of DOI's lesser-of rule as theory that cost of restoration exceeds its
marginal benefit at point below full restoration).
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of natural resource services as a way of understanding the value provided
by natural resources74 and allowed trustees to consider natural resource
services when calculating restoration costs or diminution in value.75 How-
ever, in no circumstance could the restoration alternative restore the lost
natural resource to a condition greater than the resource's baseline76 - the
condition that would have existed absent the discharge of oil or release of
the hazardous substance.' In addition, the natural resource trustees had
discretion to include the interim diminution in value of the natural resource
in addition to the restoration costs.78 In light of (1) the ability to recover
the dimnution m value m addition to restoration CoStS, 79 (2) the requirement
that trustees cap restoration at the original baseline,"u and (3) the statutory
mandate that trustees spend all recovered funds on restoring the resource,"1
trustees faced inconsistent instructions on what amount of funds to collect
and how to spend those funds.'
Within the diminution-in-value alternative, the 1986 DOI rule estab-
lished a hierarchy of methods to measure recoverable damages. First, this
rule directed the trustees to measure the diminution in use value based on
the actual market price of the injured natural resource.' Second, if the
trustees determined that the market from which the value was derived was
74. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.14(nn.), 11.35(c)(2) (1987) (defining resource services and
using services as method for determining costs of restoration); Raymond J. Kopp & V
Kerry Smith, Understanding Damages to Natural Assets, in VALUING NATURAL ASSETS:
THE EcoNoMucs OF NATuRAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT 6, 10-19 (Raymond J. Kopp
& V Kerry Smith eds., 1993) (providing practical explanation of natural resource service
flows).
75. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.81(c) (1987) (directing trustees to identify resource services
provided by injured resource in its pre-mjury and postinjury conditions to determine
restoration cost); id. § 11.84(b) (directing trustees to identify uses of resource services m
determining diminution in use value).
76. See id. § 11.82(d)(2)(i) (directing that restoration alternatives should restore lost
services to "no more than their baseline level").
77 Id. § 11.14(e).
78. See id. § 11.81(b) (directing that damages based on restoration costs "may include
any diminution of use values, occurring during the recovery period").
79. Id.
80. Id. § 11.82(d)(2)(i).
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(0(1) (1994) (mandating that money damages recovered from
CERCLA natural resource damage claim be used "only to restore, replace, or acquire the
equivalent of such natural resources").
82. See Stewart et al., supra note 22, at 163 (noting that regulations were ambiguous as
to how trustees must spend dimmution-in-value component of damages).
83. 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c)(1) (1987).
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not reasonably competitive or that a market price method was not appropri-
ate, they would measure damages as the decrease m the appraised value
caused by the injury I Third, if determning the market or appraisal value
was inappropriate, the trustees could then calculate diminution in value by
using pricing methods such as the factor income, travel cost, or hedonic
pricing methods.' In addition, the rule allowed trustees to use contingent
valuation to determine use values.86 Trustees could resort to contingent
valuation to estimate nonuse values - such as option and existence
values - only when the trustees could not measure any use values. s7
Perceptible only with methods at the bottom of DOI's hierarchy, nonuse
values would be accounted for infrequently
C. The First Fundamental Restructuring and Rethinking:
Ohio v United States Department of the Interior"8
State governments, industry associations, and environmental groups
immediately challenged the validity of DOI's original rule. 9 In Ohio v
84. Id. § 11.83(c)(2).
85. Id. § 11.83(d)(1)-(4).
86. Id. § 11.83(d)(5)(i). Since the first NRDA regulations listed CV as a possible
method for valuation of natural resource damages, that method has become a center of
controversy Generally, CV involves the use of surveys to elicit responses from randomly
selected individuals as to what value they place on natural resources. The survey formats
vary greatly, but typically involve questions as to what the individual would be willing to
sacrifice to see that the injured natural resource is returned to its normal condition. See
generally NOAA, Natural Resource Damage Assessments Under the Oil Pollution Act, 58
Fed. Reg. 4601 (1993) [hereinafter NOAA CV Study] (describing CV, noting controversy
surrounding its use, outlining its value in determining nonuse values, and concluding that
CV is valid method if used in accordance with strict and conservative guidelines); Brian R.
Binger et al., The Use of Contingent Valuation Methodology in Natural Resource Damage
Assessments: Legal Fact and Economic Fiction, 89 Nw U. L. REv 1029 (1995) (discussing
use of CV in NRDAs, results of NOAA's CV study and embedding effect, and concluding
that further research is necessary before placing undue reliance on largely experimental
valuation method).
87 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(d)(5) (1987); see Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 51
Fed. Reg. 27,674, 27,719 (1986) (noting that regulations preferred use values over nonuse
values because "more is known about the determination of use values than option and
existence values. Option and existence values are less well-defined and more uncertainty
surrounds their measurement").
88. 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that DOI's damage assessment regulations
pursuant to CERCLA were contrary to express intent of Congress).
89. See id. at 443-59 (examining evidence of congressional intent in statute and
legislative history). Shortly after the promulgation of the 1986 DOI regulations, Congress
amended CERCLA in the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) which
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United States Department of the Intenor, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit scrutimzed DOI's regulations in
relation to congressional intent regarding the valuation of natural resource
damages in CERCLA. 9 After exanung the statutory language and its
extensive legislative history, the court of appeals held that several portions
of the DOI's 1986 rule contradicted the congressional intent underlying
CERCLA.9 1 The opinion dramatically affected the popular thinking behind
compensating the public for injuries to natural resources and focused
subsequent debate on three main issues: common-law economic efficiency,
the role of nonuse values, and the use of contingent valuation. 92
First, the court of appeals considered the states' and environmental
groups' challenge to DOI's strict adherence to common-law economic
efficiency in the lesser-of rule.' The court determined that damaged
natural resources cannot be treated as replaceable personal property' and
disagreed with DOI's implementation of a common-law efficiency limitation
in the realm of natural resource damages. 9 The court soundly rejected the
lesser-of rule's central premise - that it was always economically ineffi-
cient to restore a resource when its use value was less than the cost of
restoration.9 Thus, in light of Congress's distinct preference for restora-
tion as the measure of damages, DOI erroneously treated use value and
restoration cost "as having equal presumptive legitimacy as a measure of
damages. "I
forced DOI to revise its NRDA regulations. Id. at 440. Additional parties filed challenges
to the revised rules, and the court consolidated the cases. Id.
90. Id. at 438-80.
91. Id. at 481.
92. The discussion of nonuse values in Ohio is important m the context of the OPA
regulations because Congress expressed its intent that OPA be consistent with the court's
analysis on valuing natural resources. See infra notes 152-59 and accompanying text
(discussing OPA's legislative history); notes 277-83 and accompanying text (same).
93. See Ouo, 880 F.2d at 441-59 (stating that "[tihe most significant issue m this case
concerns the validity of the regulation providing that damages for the despoilment of natural
resources shall be 'the lesser of restoration or replacement costs; or diminution of use
values'").
94. See itd. at 456 ("The fatal flaw of Interior's approach, however, is that it assumes
that natural resources are fungible goods, just like any other.").
95. See td. at 447 (commenting that DOI's misinterpretation of measure of damages
provision in CERCLA comes from reading "a common-law limitation into the word
'damages'").
96. Id. at 455-57
97 Id. at 443-44. The statutory evidence that the court relied on in finding a legisla-
tive preference for restoration included the CERCLA provision that mandates that funds
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However, before examining the statutory text and legislative history
underlying the lesser-of rule, the court paused to recognize the practical and
administrative feasibility of the economic efficiency elements in the
common-law approach. 9 The court compared DOI's approach to the
economic rationale concerning a collision-damaged car. 9 A reasonable
individual would not pay $8000 to repair a damaged used car worth
$5000.101 The rational car owner would spend $5000 to buy a car of a
value equal to the damaged car before the collision.10' However, the court
looked to the common-law exception that recognizes restoration as the
proper measure of damages when the owner has a personal reason for
preferring restoration." z In doing so, the court indicated that the non-
fungible quality of natural resources is analogous to such a personal reason
for restoration. 0 The court did not condemn DOI's attempt to promote
economic efficiency, but did reject the strict interpretation of the common
law because that interpretation failed to account for the total value of the
resource."° In addition, the court specifically sanctioned one element of
economic efficiency related to DOI's lesser-of rule: 1°' the court suggested
that use value may function as the appropriate measure of damages when
the cost of restoration is "grossly disproportionate to the use value of the
recovered m a natural resource damage claim be used "only to restore, replace, or acquire the
equivalent of such natural resources." Id. at 444 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (1988)).
In OPA, Congress was even more direct in displaying its preference for restoration. See infra
notes 152-58 and accompanying text (discussing OPA's express preference for restoration as
measure of damages).
98. See Ohio, 880 F.2d at 442 (stressing practical significance of lesser-of rule).
99 Id. at 443
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text (discussing exception to common-law
preference for diminution in value as measure of damages).
103. See Ohio, 880 F.2d at 457 & n.41 (citing Trinity Church v John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 502 N.E.2d 532, 536 (Mass. 1987) (asserting that "even the common law recognizes
that restoration is the proper remedy for injury to property where measurement of damages by
some other method will fail to compensate fully for the injury"); Weld County Bd. of
Comm'rs v. Slovek, 723 P.2d 1309, 1316-17 (Colo. 1986).
104. See KEVIN M. WARD & JOHN W DUFFIELD, NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES: LAW
AND ECONOMICS § 8.7 (1992) (emphasizing that Ohio did not reject theory of economic
efficiency itself but idea that efficiency should be measured against use value alone, as opposed
to use and nonuse values); Copple, supra note 49, at 687-88 (noting that court's problem with
lesser-of rule resulted from reliance solely on use values in valuation equation and not nonuse
values as well).
105. See Ohio, 880 F.2d at 443 (recognzing that DOI has some latitude in deciding which
measure of damages to apply).
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resource.', 0 6 Thus, the court reserved a small role for economic efficiency
while otherwise voiding DOI's common-law damage scheme m favor of a
restoration-based system. 7 Neither DOI nor the Ohio court addressed the
issue of measuring damages based partially on restoration costs and partially
on diminution in value.0 8
Second, the court of appeals discussed the environmentalist petitioners'
challenge to DOI's hierarchy of assessment methods and instructed DOI to
re-evaluate its treatment of nonuse values. 9 The court found DOI's almost
exclusive reliance on market valuation techmques offensive in light of
Congress's manifest intent that damage assessment regulations "capture
fully all aspects of loss.""'  The court's analysis validated the position held
by economists"' and the environmentalist petitioners that market values
alone will rarely, if ever, accurately represent the true value of natural
resources."' The court found that market prices were inadequate surrogates
for true value and that the deficiencies of market values created the need for
106. Id. The court of appeals further suggested that regulators may cap restoration cost
at "three-times the amount of use value" or that DOI may measure damages by use value when
the ability of the resource to recover is doubtful. Id. at 443-44 n.7 For example, if the cost
of restoration is $4 million, but the total value of the resource is only $1 million, the amount
of damages sought by natural resource trustees would be $3 million. Although the court only
offered the three-to-one ratio as an example, some commentators expected it to function as the
new yardstick for econorue efficiency and the primary issue for litigation concerning maxi-
mum damage calculations. See Copple, supra note 49, at 689 (noting potential interpretations
of court's three-to-one ratio to determine when damages are grossly disproportionate).
107 See Ohio, 880 F.2d at 459 (concluding that DOI may establish standard for when
to use measures other than restoration, but that Congress preferred restoration as norm). The
court further clarified that it was not saying that Congress had forsworn the goal of efficiency-
"'Efficiency,' standing alone, simply means that the chosen policy will dictate the result that
achieves the greatest value to society Whether a particular choice is efficient depends on how
the vanous alternatives are valued." Id. at 456; see also Copple, supra note 49, at 686
(noting that Ohio "cannot be read as either rejecting all considerations of economic efficiency
in natural resource damage assessments or as absolutely mandating restoration costs as the
appropriate measure of damages").
108. See WARD & DUFFIELD, supra note 104, § 8.8 (noting that DOI regulations and
Ohio reflect confusion as to what is efficient level of damages and suggesting that true
efficiency may be achieved by "some intermediate level of restoration plus compensation").
109. Ohio, 880 F.2d at 462-64.
110. Id. at 463.
111. See NOAA CV Study, supra note 86, at 4602 (noting that economists have recog-
nized for over 25 years that people not using natural resources still derive satisfaction from
them).
112. See Ohio, 880 F.2d at 462-63 (explainng that although it is not irrational to consider
market value in valuing natural resources, it is unreasonable to view it as exclusive or even
predominant factor).
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alternative valuation techniques such as contingent valuation. 3 The court
instructed DOI to develop assessment methods that fully consider use and
nonuse values - such as option and existence values - and suggested that
a valuation not accounting for nonconsumptive values would be incom-
plete." 4 The Ohio court further legitimized the view that "[o]ption and
existence values may represent 'passive' use, but they nonetheless reflect
utility derived by humans from a resource, and thus, prinma facie, ought to
be included in a damage assessment."" 5
Third, the court of appeals examined the use of contingent valuation to
determine use and nonuse values." 6 Ultimately, the court rejected the indus-
try petitioners' three-fold claim that (1) the use of contingent valuation con-
flicted with common-law damage assessment principles, (2) contingent valua-
tion was less than a "best available procedure," and (3) granting a rebuttable
presumption to damage assessments conducted with contingent valuation was
arbitrary and capricious." 7 The industry petitioners argued that because
contingent valuation did not ask the survey respondents to pay actual money,
it overstated a respondent's willingness to pay for the natural resource."18
The D C. Circuit admitted that a tendency for overstatement inhered in the
method, but found that sophisticated questioning could effectively safeguard
against inflated results." 9 In addition, the court rejected the argument that
contingent valuation is inherently biased because it is conducted in the midst
of media attention to an oil spill or hazardous substance leak.1"° The court
found that trustees could structure a contingent valuation survey to avoid
inherent "undue upward biases" and held that, for the time being, that
method was a best available procedure under the mandate of CERCLA.' 2I
113. Id. at 463 (citing United States v Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123
(1950)). The court asserted that most natural resources have no markets, and for the few
natural resources that do have markets, market price alone cannot capture the total value.
See id. at 457-63 & n.40 (noting that market fails to account for important ecological
attributes, including consumer surplus - difference between willingness to pay and market
price - and, presumably, ecological services).
114. See Ohio, 880 F.2d at 464 (noting that market value alone represents incomplete
valuation and instructing DOI that limiting role of nonconsumptive values is erroneous
reading of CERCLA).
115. Id. (citing Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L.
REV 269, 285-89 (1989)).
116. Id. at 474-81.
117 Id. at 476.
118. Id; see supra note 86 (generally describing use of CV method to assess damages).
119. Ohio, 880 F.2d at 477-78.
120. Id. at 478.
121. Id.
1530
NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS
In a related argument, the industry petitioners claimed that the 1986
DOI rule gave natural resource trustees insufficient guidance on the use of
contingent valuation in damage assessments." 2 The court defended the rule's
flexibility, citing the many different scenarios of natural resource damages
that natural resource trustees must confront.'23 The court noted that the
nature and extent of the oil or hazardous substance spill or leak and the
characteristics of the physical area damaged will dictate what procedures a
trustee should use and how to use them.12 Thus, the court found that the
1986 DOI rule provided sufficient guidance to natural resource trustees, and
that the degree of flexibility and discretion afforded trustees was necessary 125
The court's discussion of common-law damage theory, damage valuation
techniques, and contingent valuation did more than force DOI to change its
rule. Partly because judicial review of the natural resource damage valuation
process is rare, the case fundamentally restructured natural resource damage
assessments. 12 The court sought to ensure that damage assessments capture
the total value of the injured resource and focused attention on nonuse
values. The court succeeded m changing the direction of natural resource
valuation and legitimized the idea that restoration is the better measure to
capture the true value of a resource and compensate the public. However,
Ohio and the regulations that it scrutinized evidence a preoccupation with
reducing all economic and noneconomic values to a single metric: the court
failed to explore the inadequacies of reducing the valuation of nonfungible
goods to a pricing model.127
D. DOI Revises Its Damage Assessment Regulations
In order to comply with the court's decision m Ohio, DOI reproposed
its regulations m April 1991.'1 When DOI finalized those regulations almost
two years later, it reserved the section on recovery of nonuse values for
further study' 29 and expressed a willingness to follow NOAA's lead on
122. Id. at 479-80.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 480.
126. See Kopp et al., The Economics Have Shifted, supra note 29, at 10,127 (noting
that Ohio "dramatically change[d] the playing field for conflicts between plaintiffs and
defendants m natural resource damage cases").
127 See Williams, supra note 42, at 383-94 (explaining that although Ohio promoted
restoration-based compensation, it also further entrenched pricing rhetoric).
128. Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 56 Fed. Reg. 19,752 (proposed April 29,
1991).
129. Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 59 Fed. Reg. 14,261, 14,262 (Mar. 25,
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nonuse valuation. 3  The damage assessment regulations promulgated by
DOI in 1991 applied to natural resource damages resulting from the dis-
charge of oil until February 6, 1996.131
The fundamental change m the revised DOI regulations was the imple-
mentation of CERCLA's preference for restoration as the appropriate
measure of damages.132 As a result, the provision in the original regula-
tions allowing trustees to include diminution in value pending recovery
assumed greater importance. In place of measuring damages as the lesser
of the diminution m value or restoration cost, DOI adopted a measure based
on varying degrees of restoration plus interim diminution in value.' As
part of the new measure of damages, DOI introduced the concept of "com-
pensable value," which represents the diminution in value of the natural
resource and its services from the time of the injury until recovery, inde-
pendent of and in addition to the cost of restoration."3 Moreover, DOI
directed that the compensable value include nonuse values as well as use
values. 35 Consequently, DOI expanded the recoverable damages in two
ways: (1) the trustees could seek to recover the cost of restoration in
1994) (codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11) (effective April 25, 1994). The current form of DOI's
regulations is an amalgamation of various final rules: 51 Fed. Reg. 27,674 (Aug. 1, 1986),
52 Fed. Reg. 9042 (Mar. 20, 1987), 53 Fed. Reg. 5166 (Feb. 22, 1988), 53 Fed. Reg. 9769
(Mar. 25, 1988), and 59 Fed. Reg. 14,261 (Mar. 25, 1994).
130. See Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 59 Fed. Reg. 23,098, 23,098
(proposed May 4, 1994) (soliciting comments on NOAA's prior proposed rulemakmg at 59
Fed. Reg. 1167 (Jan. 7, 1994) and ending comment period on July 7, 1994). DOI has not
issued a final rule regarding nonuse issues within Type B assessments but has expressed a
desire to conform its final rule with NOAA's Final Rule. See 59 Fed. Reg. 23,098, 23,099
(noting DOI will consider ways to "ensure the greatest consistency appropriate" with
NOAA's regulations).
131. See Final Rule, supra note 10, at 502 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.20)
(stating that DOI's regulations apply to natural resource damages resulting from discharge
of oil, that Final Rule supersedes those regulations as to that type of damages, and that
trustees may complete assessments commenced before February 5, 1996, in compliance with
existing CERCLA regulations); see also 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (1994) (stating that notwith-
standing any other provision of law, party responsible for discharge of oil is liable under
OPA).
132. See Copple, supra note 49, at 690 (describing DOI's incorporation of restoration
preference as most significant change in rules).
133. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.80(b) (1995) (noting that trustees have discretion to include
value of lost services from tune of release to attainment of restoration); Copple, supra note
49, at 691 (describing expansion of recoverable damages in new DOI regulations).
134. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c) (1995) (defining compensable value).
135. See id. (noting that compensable value includes "the value of lost public use of the
services provided by the injured resources, plus lost nonuse values such as existence and
bequest values").
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addition to a temporary diminution m value, and (2) the new dimnution-m-
value component - compensable value - would include nonuse values.
136
DOI chose to forgo the efficiency inherent in the lesser-of rule and
chose not to replace it with any explicit efficiency constraint. 3 7 In its
place, DOI established a set of criteria to guide the trustees in selecting the
cost estimation and valuation methods. 13' DOI instructed trustees to select
assessment procedures that are performable at a reasonable cost and that are
cost-effective.'39 In addition, DOI implemented a list of ten criteria that
natural resource trustees must use to evaluate the several damage alterna-
tives that they have developed by using the cost-effective procedures."o
The second of these ten factors requires that trustees evaluate the expected
costs of every restoration alternative in relation to the expected benefits it
will produce.' 4' One commentator described the result as a "new economc
efficiency" implicit in conducting a cost-benefit analysis for each of several
alternative actions comprised of differing levels of restoration and compen-
sation. 42 This hybrid solution - addressed neither by DOI in 1986 nor by
the Ohio court - prevailed in DOI's revised regulations. 43 The trustees
136. See Williams, supra note 42, at 427-34 (describing significant role of compensable
value in revised DOI rule and arguing that it embodies purely economic approach to
damages).
137 See Copple, supra note 49, at 692-701 (detailing omission of lesser-of rule and
lack of replacement with any grossly disproportionate standard). Copple ultimately finds
alternative elements of an implicit "new economic efficiency " Id.
138. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(a)(3) (1995) (directing trustees to use methods that: (1) are
feasible and reliable for particular incident, (2) are performable at reasonable cost, (3) pre-
vent double counting, and (4) are cost-effective).
139. Id. § 1.83(a)(3)(ii),(iv).
140. Id. § 11.82(d). The 10 factors include, generally- (1) technical feasibility, (2) the
relationship of the cost of the alternative to its benefits, (3) cost-effectiveness, (4) results of
actual or planned response actions, (5) potential for additional mjury resulting from the
action, (6) the natural recovery period, (7) ability of the resource to recover with or without
action, (8) potential effects of the action on human health and safety, (9) consistency with
federal, state, and tribal policies, and (10) compliance with federal, state, and tribal policies.
Id.
141. Id. § 11.82(d)(2).
142. See Copple, supra note 49, at 693-701 (finding "new economic efficiency" in
"some form of a sliding scale with minimal restoration or natural recovery plus higher lost
future compensable value at one end, and at the other end, significant and intensive restora-
tion plus more minimal lost future compensable value" that results from application of
enumerated factors).
143. See supra notes 88-127 and accompanying text (discussing Ohio decision generally
and noting that neither DOI nor court of appeals in Ohio discussed hybrid solution of part
restoration cost plus part diminution m value).
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will look at several combinations of varying degrees of restoration and
monetary damages and consider each alternative's total economic
efficiency 144 The natural resource trustees act within a two-tiered check on
economic efficiency that relies on cost-benefit and cost-efficiency analyses
conducted both when selecting the assessment procedures and when evaluat-
ing the restoration alternatives.145
IlI. NOAA Assumes the Lead in Natural Resource Damage
Assessment Regulation
In March 1989, the Exxon Valdez ran aground off the coast of Alaska
and spilled more than eleven million gallons of oil into Prince William
Sound."4 Scores of scientists descended on Alaska and spent over $100
million studying the effects of the spill and developing information to use
in litigation against Exxon. 47 The natural resource trustees valued the
damage at over $3 billion, but eventually settled their claim against Exxon
for just over $1 billion. 48 The trustees arrived at the $3 billion figure by
relying on the contingent valuation method, and the controversy surround-
ng that method gamed public attention. 149 As the federal and state regula-
tory agencies were cleaning up the oil and assessing damages in Prince
William Sound, Congress began considering oil pollution legislation.' In
August 1990, sixteen months after the Exxon spill, the House and Senate
passed OPA with no dissenting votes, thus revamping mandatory oil pollu-
tion prevention and liability measures."'
144. See Williams, supra note 42, at 433 (arguing that revised DOI rule requires
trustees to justify restoration costs in terms of efficiency of total damages).
145. See Kopp & Smith, supra note 74, at 9 (noting that revised DOI regulations
actually provide trustees with discretion to ensure that damages correspond to economic
view of damages); Williams, supra note 42, at 426-34 (noting that cost-benefit comparisons
in revised DOI rules continue emphasis on pricing rhetoric and efficiency and amount to
finely tuned lesser-of rule).
146. Wesley Loy, Dredging for Lessons from the Tragedy in Prince William Sound,
WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1993, at A3. The Exxon spill spread oil over an area 15 times the
size of the state of Rhode Island and was the largest spill m United States history Id.
147 Id.
148. See id. (discussing eventual settlement).
149 See Frank B. Cross, Restoring Restoration for Natural Resource Damages, 24 U.
TOL. L. REv 319, 328 (1993) (noting that plaintiffs in Exxon spill built case for damages
largely on contingent valuation).
150. Don Phillips, Oil Spill Legislation Sweeps Through Congress: Bill Would Raise
Liability of Tanker Owners and Require Double Hulls on Ships by 2010, WASH. POST, Aug.
5, 1990, at A18.
151. Id.
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A. OPA's Provision for Assessing Natural Resource Damages
The emphasis on restoration m CERCLA that was apparent to the D.C.
Circuit is even more evident in OPA. 52 First, Congress expanded the
statutory components of natural resource damages and mandated recovery
of: (1) the cost of restoration, (2) the diminution in value of the resource
pending restoration, and (3) the reasonable cost of assessing the first two
components. 53 Second, Congress not only mandated that trustees spend all
sums recovered from a natural resource damage claim on enhancing the
natural resource," 4 it instructed the natural resource trustees to develop and
implement the plan for restoration on wich the damage claim was based.155
In addition, Congress made it clear that trustees must include lost use and
nonuse values in the dimnution-rn-value component of damages.156 The
legislators cited, with full approval, the reasoning in Ohio as to the mea-
surement of interim dimnution in value."s Thus, it is evident that Con-
gress, responding to the public reaction to the catastrophe in Prince William
Sound, sought to mandate full restoration of the entire econonuc value of
damaged natural resources"' s and took another step toward fully recognizing
the public's loss from natural resource injuries. However, by following
Ohio, Congress and NOAA remained focused on the economic pricing of
152. See Mazzotta et al., supra note 69, at 157-58 (noting that preference for restora-
tion is abundantly evident in OPA).
153. See 33 U.S.C. § 2706(d)(1) (1994) (providing measure of natural resource dam-
ages as sum of "(a) the cost of restoring, rehabilitating, replacing, or acquiring the equiva-
lent of, the damaged natural resources; (b) the diminution in value of those natural resources
pending restoration; plus (c) the reasonable cost of assessing those damages").
154. Id. § 2706(f).
155. See id. § 2706(c) (directing federal, state, foreign, and Indian trustees to "develop
and implement a plan for the restoration, rehabilitation, replacement, or acquisition of the
equivalent, of the natural resources"); Mazzotta et al., supra note 69, at 158 (inferring that
trustees must implement same restoration plan that served as basis for assessment).
156. See S. REP. No. 101-94, at 15 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 736-
37 (noting that trustees must use all sums recovered in natural resource damages claim to
restore or acquire equivalent resources).
157 See id. (stating that OPA is intended to be consistent with Ohio); H.R. CoNF
REP. No. 101-653, at 108 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 786 (referring to
Ohio for explanation of diminution-m-value measurement and other standards for measuring
damages).
158. See S. REP. No. 101-94, at 15, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 737 ("The
bill makes it clear that forests are more than board feet of lumber, and that seals and sea
otters are more than just commodities traded on the market. It would clarify that in the
wake of spills like the Exxon Valdez, all reasonable demonstrable natural resource damages
caused by a spill are paid by the responsible parties, rather than borne by the public.").
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nonuse values, disregarding the diversity of incommensurable values
inherent in most natural resources. 59
B. NOAA's Early Attempts at Damage Assessment
Regulations Under OPA
Although OPA allowed two years for NOAA to promulgate regulations
on the assessment of natural resource damages, NOAA did not propose
damage assessment regulations until January 1994 .11 At least part of this
delay resulted from NOAA's study to determine if the positive aspects of
using contingent valuation in damage assessments outweighed the contro-
versy surrounding that method. 16 The study resulted m a qualified en-
dorsement of contingent valuation's ability to convey useful information on
nonuse values.162 NOAA admitted that trustees should expect some bias
and overstatement of willingness to pay when using contingent valuation,
but noted that trustees can correct or offset those flaws if they follow
certain recommended guidelines. 63
NOAA's first attempt at damage assessment regulations, in January of
1994, mirrored DOI's revised regulations in many respects.164 However,
NOAA expanded the number of categories of assessments 65 and directed
159 See infra notes 331-36 and accompanying text (discussing economic pricing
theory's inability to gauge diverse ways that people value natural resources).
160. Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 59 Fed. Reg. 1061 (proposed Jan. 7,
1994) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 990) [hereinafter 1994 Proposed Rule]; see 33 U.S.C.
§ 2706(e)(i) (1994) (directing President to act through various agencies to promulgate
regulations for assessment of natural resource damages resulting from discharge of oil no
later than August 18, 1992).
161. See NOAA CV Study, supra note 86, at 4601 (noting positive and negative aspects
of CV). NOAA's CV Study noted that opponents of CV argue that responses are mconsis-
tent with rational choice, respondents do not understand the questioning, and that the surveys
lead to overstated values. Id. at 4601-03. NOAA added that CV was probably the only
method to determine the nonuse values of natural resources. Id. at 4603.
162. See id. at 4610-11 (concluding that CV surveys can produce estimates to serve as
starting point for NRDA litigation if studies follow strict guidelines).
163. Id.
164. See Copple, supra note 25, at 10,673 (outlinmg parallel between DOI rules and
NOAA's first attempt); Williams, supra note 42, at 428-29 (noting that NOAA and DOI
rules are similar but that NOAA rule is "much less resistant to restoration costs as the
presumptive measure of damages"); see generally Susan A. Austin, The National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration's Proposed Rules for Natural Resource Damage Assessment
Under the Oil Pollution Act, 18 HARv ENVTL. L. REv 549 (1994) (discussing 1994
proposed rule in detail and its implications).
165. The four assessment procedures were: (1) compensation formulas, (2) computer
models, (3) Expedited Damage Assessments, and (4) Comprehensive Damage Assessments.
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trustees to recover all restoration costs m addition to a compensable value
that included monetized use and nonuse values.166 For the most comprehen-
sive category of assessments, the 1994 proposed rule specifically listed five
methods for measuring compensable values. 167 NOAA limited the use of
each of the methods, except contingent valuation, to specific damage
scenarios. 16  NOAA's proposed rule gave natural resource trustees exten-
sive guidance on how to use contingent valuation, but placed little limitation
on when trustees may use that method.169 NOAA did suggest, however,
that when the trustees decide between valuation alternatives, they should
select the alternative that would underestimate, rather than overestimate, the
damages. 170
In response to the voluminous comments received on the January 1994
proposal, NOAA "fundamentally restructured" the damage assessment
procedure to place even greater emphasis on restoration and reproposed its
regulations in August 1995.'17 NOAA summarized the differences in the
new approach as: (1) the elimination of the need to determine compensable
values as a separate component of natural resource damage claims, (2) a
1994 Proposed Rule, supra note 160, at 1061.
166. Id. at 1182 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.77(g)-(h)).
167 See id. at 1182-83 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.78(b)(1)-(5)) (listing travel
cost method, factor income method, hedonic price method, market methods, and CV). In
addition, NOAA listed two "alternative method"- the benefits transfer approach and the
habitat or species replacement cost method. Id. at 1183-84 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R.
§ 990.78(c)).
168. See id. at 1182 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.78(b)(1)-(4)) (limiting use of
travel cost method to estimation of value of recreational services; limiting use of factor
income method to valuation of services that function as input to production process; limiting
use of hedomc price model to valuation of nonmarket services provided by natural resource;
and limiting use of market methods of supply and demand to valuation of natural resources
traded in markets).
169. See id. at 1182-83 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.78(b)(5)) (permitting use of
contingent valuation "to determine individuals' valuation of natural resources or of the
services provided by natural resources in order to estimate compensable values"); Williams,
supra note 42, at 437 (stating that proposed NOAA and DOI rules authorize "general resort"
to contingent valuation).
170. 1994 Proposed Rule, supra note 160, at 1146; see Austin, supra note 164, at 559-
60 (discussing NOAA's underestimation preference, adoption of 50% discount factor, and
use of willingness-to-pay over willingness-to-accept criterion within CV surveys as elements
of "a conservative approach").
171. See Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 60 Fed. Reg. 39,804, 39,804
(proposed Aug. 3, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 Proposed Rule] (stating that, based on numerous
public comments, "NOAA is considering a fundamental restructuring of the rule to provide
even greater emphasis upon restoration").
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new emphasis on restoration of what actually was lost - the natural resource
and its human and ecological services, (3) an increased public involvement
in the selection of the restoration action, and (4) the increased flexibility
afforded natural resource trustees to determine appropriate assessment
methods on a case-by-case basis."7 A tight judicial deadline forced NOAA
to limit the public comment period to thirty days and to submit a final rule
for publication by December 31, 1995.173
C. NOAA's 1996 Final Rule
NOAA published its long-awaited Final Rule on January 5, 1996,
maintaining the fundamental changes introduced in its 1995 proposal. Like
previous damage assessment regulations, the Final Rule seeks to return the
injured natural resource to its baseline promptly and to compensate the public
for the permanent or interim loss resulting from the natural resource
injury 174 However, unlike previous regulations, the Final Rule states that
the purpose of OPA and NRDA regulation is to "make the environment and
public whole," as opposed to previous rules that sought only to "make the
public whole."75 This subtle change in phrasing of the stated purpose
symbolizes the change in focus in the new approach. 1
76
To comprehend the new concepts in valuation and compensation, it is
helpful first to understand the Final Rule's assessment procedure. Like prior
NRDA rules, NOAA's Final Rule is divided into phases: Preassessment,
Restoration Planning, and Restoration Implementation. " In Preassessment,
the trustees pursue limited data collection 7 1 to determine whether they have
jurisdiction to conduct restoration under OPA and whether it is appropriate
to do so.179 If the trustees decide to proceed to the next phase, they must
172. Id.
173. See td. (cautioning reviewers of 1995 proposed rule that final rule is subject to
deadline in consent decree i NRDC v. United States Coast Guard, No. CV-94-4892
(E.D.N.Y June 26, 1995) (order for partial settlement)).
174. Final Rule, supra note 10, at 500 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.10).
175. Compare Final Rule, supra note 10, at 440 ("The goal of the [OPAl is to make
the environment and public whole"), with 1994 Proposed Rule, supra note 160, at 1139-40
(noting that trustees should "use the diminution-m-value sums m a way to make the public
whole [and] the purpose of the litigation is to make the public whole").
176. See mfra notes 293-98 and accompanying text (discussing effect of concentrating
on ecological services, rather than services to public, to compensate environment).
177 Final Rule, supra note 10, at 500 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.12).
178. See td. at 477 (noting that any data collection must be limited to that which is
reasonably related to trustees' goals at that stage of assessment).
179 Id. at 505 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.40).
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first publish a Notice of Intent to Conduct Restoration Planning, open an
admnistrative record,"m and invite the responsible parties to participate in the
damage assessment no later than the publication of the Notice.'
NOAA broke down the next phase, Restoration Planning, into Injury
Assessment - the evaluation and quantification of potential injuries - and
Restoration Selection - the determination of the need for and scale of restor-
ation. 82 To perform the Injury Assessment, the trustees identify injuries
from the release of oil, determine which injuries deserve attention, and
quantify those mjues.in The trustees' approach to quantification may range
from emphasis on the physical nature of the injured natural resource to
exclusive evaluation of the impaired natural resource services.114
The Restoration Selection portion of the Restoration Planning Phase
embodies NOAA's new approach to natural resource valuation. " In that
stage, the trustees consider a reasonable range of restoration alternatives,
each comprising primary and compensatory restoration components that to-
gether make the environment and public whole. Primary restoration con-
notes the traditional meaning of restoration, as used in prior regulations, and
consists of human intervention or natural recovery that returns the injured
resource to its baseline condition. 186 In the primary restoration component
of each alternative, the trustees must consider at least one natural recovery
alternative and at least one active primary restoration alternative. 187
180. Id. at 505-06 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 990.44- 45).
181. Id. at 500 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.14(c)(i)-(2)).
182. Id. at 441, 506 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.50).
183. Id. at 506-07 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 990.51-.52). A significant change
in the Final Rule not discussed in this Note is the new definition of injury NOAA now
defines injury as "an observable (i.e., qualitative) or measurable (i.e., quantitative) adverse
change in a natural resource or impairment of a natural resource service." Id. at 447
Consequently, "the 'mere presence' of oil will not constitute an injury under the rule." Id.
at 472; see Copple, supra note 25, at 10,674-75 (discussing change to definition of injury).
184. Final Rule, supra note 10, at 506 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.52(b)).
185. Id. (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.53); see Copple, supra note 25, at 10,674
(noting that Restoration Plannig Phase "encompasses the bulk of NOAA's new conceptual
approach" and is what "ostensibly make[s] the 1995 Proposed Rule different from its
predecessors").
186. Final Rule, supra note 10, at 505 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.30).
187 Id. at 507 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(b)). In the natural recovery
alternative, "no human intervention would be taken to directly restore injured natural
resources and services to baseline." Id. (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(b)(2)). An
active primary restoration alternative is "an alternative comprised of actions to directly
restore the natural resources and services to baseline on an accelerated time frame." Id. (to
be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(b)(3)). Primary restoration can include "on-site, off-site,
in-kind, and/or out-of-kind restoration actions." Id. at 483.
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As a component of each alternative, the trustees must also consider
compensatory restoration actions - actions designed to compensate the
public for the interim loss of the injured natural resources and services
pending recovery in the form of actual natural resources and services.' 8
Compensatory restoration, which replaces the concept of compensable
value, 189 is based on the idea that returnig the natural resource to its
baseline condition and paying monetary damages for interim lost value are
insufficient to accomplish the goal of making the environment and public
whole. Thus, whenever the injury involves a loss of natural resource
services pending restoration, the trustees must consider compensatory
restoration."9 NOAA uses the example of a public beach closed due to oil-
soaked sand after an oil spill.' 9' Restoring the beach alone would not
compensate the public for its loss of recreational beach days during the
closure. However, the trustees can design compensatory restoration to
create an additional number of recreational beach days over time, perhaps
by improving access to the existing beachfront.'1 The Final Rule requires
that trustees first consider compensatory restoration actions that provide
replacement resources or services of the same type and quality and of
comparable value as those mjured. 93 When consideration of the same type
and quality of replacement services would be infeasible or would not
provide a reasonable range of alternatives, the trustees may then consider
replacement services of a comparable type and quality "9' The abandonment
of the concept of compensable value, in favor of compensatory restoration,
is perhaps the most significant practical and theoretical change in the new
approach. 95
After identifying a range of alternatives that consist of primary and
compensatory restoration, the trustees must deternmne the appropriate scale
188. Id. at 507 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(c)). Compensatory Restoration
is defined as "action taken to compensate for interim losses of natural resources and services
that occur from the date of the incident until recovery " Id. at 505 (to be codified at 15
C.F.R. § 990.30); see Mazzotta et al., supra note 69, at 170-74 (outlining process for
restoration-based compensation similar to compensatory restoration m Final Rule).
189 See supra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing concept of compensable
value).
190. Final Rule, supra note 10, at 483.
191. Id. at 453, 484.
192. Id. at 453.
193. Id. at 507 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(c)(2)).
194. Id.
195. See infra notes 265-366 and accompanying text (discussing practical and theoretical
significance associated with new concept of compensatory restoration).
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of each alternative that will make the environment and public whole.196
NOAA uses the term "scaling" to mean the creation of a quantitative
equivalency between lost resources and services and the replacement
resources and services over time. 97 This equivalency or balance is struck
when the replacement services will make the environment and public whole.
The Final Rule indicates that trustees must scale those primary restoration
actions that involve replacement or acquisition of equivalent resources and
all compensatory restoration actions.19 NOAA developed two possible
types of scaling approaches: (1) the resource-to-resource and service-to-
service approaches (collectively referred to herein as the service-to-service
approaches) and (2) the valuation approach.' The former approach is new
to damage assessment regulations.
Under the Final Rule, the trustees must consider the service-to-service
scaling approaches for restoration actions that provide natural resources and
services of the same type and quality and of comparable value as those
lost.' This approach is based on matching quantities and qualities of the
lost resources and services with other additional resources and services over
time."' Trustees will strike a balance between lost resources and services
and the compensatory resources, adjusting for the time it will take replace-
ment services to fully develop.2' NOAA recommends the use of Habitat
Equivalency Analysis (HEA) under the service-to-service approaches when
the spill consists of injury to indirect or off-site human use."' In a brief
description of HEA, NOAA notes that it involves creating a balance be-
tween the present value of the quantity of the lost services and the present
value of the quantity of services contemplated by the restoration action,
wuch will produce resource value over time.' HEA, an economic annuity
approach, appears to be a method well suited to serve the Final Rule's
196. Final Rule, supra note 10, at 507 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(d)).
197 Id. (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(d)(2)).
198. Id. at 485-86.
199. Id. at 452-53, 507 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(d)(2)-(3)).
200. Id. at 507 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(d)(2)).
201. Id. (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(d)(2)).
202. See id. at 453-54 (noting that resource-to-resource approach must be discounted
to account for differences m tune of injury and replacement resources).
203. Id. NOAA does not limit the trustees to any one procedure or set of procedures,
but permits trustees to use any procedure deemed appropriate under 15 C.F.R. § 990.27
Id. at 498; see mfra notes 215-20 and accompanying text (discussing criteria for assessment
procedure selection). This latest rulemaking procedure from NOAA is the first to recom-
mend HEA.
204. Final Rule, supra note 10, at 498.
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emphasis on compensating for interim lost values with additional services.'
Like the new approach, HEA avoids using dollar values and focuses on
replacing lost environmental services with additional environmental ser-
vices.' In addition, both are based on discounting future restoration to
present value by using a rate to reflect social preference for present as
opposed to future natural resources.207
When considering only restoration alternatives that consist of resources
of the same type and quality as those lost will not allow the trustees to
produce a reasonable range of alternatives, or when the trustees determine
that the service-to-service approaches are inappropriate, the trustees may
resort to a valuation approach."°s Under the valuation approach, the trust-
ees determine a precise value of the injured resource and its services and
scale the replacement resources and services to that value.3 The trustees
may use a variety of units of value, including units of resource service or
dollars. 210 The Final Rule lists several valuation approaches that may be
appropriate,21 but unlike NOAA's 1994 proposed rule, the Final Rule does
not offer guidance as to when trustees must use each valuation procedure.212
However, the Final Rule does indicate that trustees may resort to calculat-
205. See generally Robert E. Unsworth & Richard C. Bishop, Assessing Natural
Resource Damages Using Environmental Annuities, 11 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 35 (1994)
(recommending environmental annuities in place of more costly and lengthy traditional
valuation methods and applying annuity approach to oil spill). Environmental annuities are
based on the assumption that the government can compensate the public for lost environmen-
tal services by providing additional services over time. Id. at 35-36.
206. See id. at 37 (noting that annuity concept does not use "the usual dollar metric"
and that it can use, for example, replacement wetland acres).
207 Compare id. (stating that goal is to find amount of "environmental services in
perpetuity that is sufficient in present value terms to equal the present value of damages"),
with Final Rule, supra note 10, at 489 (directing trustee to use "the rate at which society is
willing to trade off natural resources during the period of the incident for natural resources
during the period of restoration action").
208. Final Rule, supra note 10, at 507 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(d)(3)(i)).
The service-to-service approaches may not be appropriate when the restoration action
involves resources that are not of the same type and quality or not of comparable value. See
td. at 453 (directing that trustees "must consider" resource-to-resource approach when
restoration action involves resources of same type and quality).
209 Id. at 453.
210. Id.
211. See id. at 498-99 app. B (listing valuation procedures, including travel cost
method, factor income approach, hedonic price model, market models of demand and
supply, contingent valuation, conjoint analysis, and benefits transfer approach).
212. See supra notes 167-69 (discussing less flexible parameters for use of certain
valuation methods in NOAA's 1994 proposed rule).
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mg a monetary value only when they cannot conduct a service-to-service or
valuation approach at a reasonable cost or within a reasonable time.21 3
Only then may the trustees calculate the dollar value of the lost services and
select replacement services of the same dollar value.2"4
In the Final Rule, NOAA gives natural resource trustees flexibility to
determine wuch assessment procedures they will use.215 Instead of specify-
ig when to use certain econormc and scientific methods, as in prior rules,
NOAA simply offers a list of criteria for the trustees to use in evaluating
assessment procedures. The Final Rule specifies that: (1) the 'procedure
must be capable of determining the type and scale of the restoration action,
(2) the additional cost of a procedure must relate to the additional quantity
and quality of information it provides, and (3) the procedure must be
"reliable and valid" for the specific injury 216 When more than one assess-
ment procedure providing the same type and quality of information is
available, the trustees must use the most cost-effective procedure.2 7 The
Final Rule also allows responsible parties to request procedures other than
those selected by the trustees.2 8 The parties may request other procedures
if they identify and support their procedures, agree to advance the costs of
the procedures, and agree not to challenge the results of those proce-
dures. 219 Nevertheless, the Final Rule allows the trustees a new breadth of
discretion to reject a responsible party's request for different procedures.'
213. Final Rule, supra note 10, at 507 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(d)(3)(ii)).
214. Id.
215. See Copple, supra note 25, at 10,677 (noting increased flexibility to trustees m
NOAA's 1995 proposed rule and concluding that increased flexibility will result m increased
transaction costs).
216. Final Rule, supra note 10, at 503 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.27(a)). The
Final Rule notes that any assessment procedure:
[Must comply with all of the following standards if they are to be m accordance
with this part: (1) The procedure must be capable of providing assessment
information of use m determining the type and scale of restoration appropriate
for a particular injury; (2) The additional cost of a more complex procedure must
be reasonably related to the expected increase in the quantity and/or quality of
relevant information provided by the more complex procedure; and (3) The
procedure must be reliable and valid for the particular incident.
Id.
217 Id. at 503 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.27(c)(2)).
218. Id. at 501 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.14(c)(6)).
219. Id. (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.14(c)(6)(i)).
220. Id. at 501 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.14(c)(6)(ii)) (listing five potential
reasons for rejection of responsible party's request for procedures).
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Once the trustees develop a reasonable range of restoration alterna-
tives, they must evaluate each of the scaled alternatives according to six
standards.l If the trustees determine that two or more restoration alterna-
tives are equally preferable based on these six standards, they must select
the most cost-effective alternative.' After evaluating the alternatives, the
trustees must develop, for public comment, a Draft Restoration Plan that
includes their preferred restoration alternative and a discussion of the range
of alternatives considered and rejected.' In response to the public com-
ments, the trustees must publish a Final Restoration Plan with explanations
of resulting modifications, or the lack thereof, in the final plan.' Finally,
the trustees will present a demand to the responsible parties either to
implement the Final Restoration Plan under trustee oversight or to advance
to the trustees a sum representing all costs associated with implementing the
Final Restoration Plan with future restoration costs discounted to present
value.' NOAA gives trustees the authority and discretion to settle a
natural resource damage claim with the responsible parties at any time in
this process provided the trustees find the settlement adequate to satisfy the
goals of OPA.Y All funds received by the trustees in satisfaction of the
damage claim must be used to reimburse the trustees and to implement the
restoration plan.227
221. Id. at 507 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.54(a)). The standards include:
(1) the cost, (2) the extent to which the alternative is expected to return the resource and
services to baseline and compensate the public for the interim losses, (3) the likelihood of
success, (4) the extent to which the alternative prevents future or collateral injuries, (5) the
extent to which the alternative benefits more than one natural resource, and (6) the effect
of the alternative on public health and safety Id.
222. Final Rule, supra note 10, at 508 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.54(b)); see
infra notes 230-52 and accompanying text (discussing elements of economic efficiency in
Final Rule's six preferred restoration plan selection standards).
223. Final Rule, supra note 10, at 508 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.55(a)-(b)).
224. Id. at 508 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.55(d)).
225. Id. at 509 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.62(b)).
226. See id. at 503 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.25) (allowing trustees to settle
claims at any time, if they find that the settlement is "adequate in the judgment of the
trustees to satisfy the goal of OPA and is fair, reasonable, and in the public interest, with
particular consideration of the adequacy of the settlement to restore, replace, rehabilitate,
or acquire the equivalent of the injured natural resources and services").
227 Id. at 509 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.65(a)).
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IV. Analysis of the New Approach
Money does not pay for anything, never has, never will. It is an eco-
nomic axiom as old as the hills that goods and services can be paid for
only with goods and services.
- Albert J. Nock 8
NOAA has developed a damage assessment theory that reflects Nock's
idea - lost natural resources and services can be paid for only with other
natural resources and services. Implicit in this idea is that reducing the
value of a good, service, or natural resource to monetary terms distorts that
value. With the Ohio decision and the subsequent adoption of the restora-
tion solution m CERCLA and OPA, U.S. environmental policy has largely
accepted restoration as the primary measure of damages for injuries to
natural resources. 9  Thus, a question arises as to the best method of
effectively and accurately compensating the public for its loss pending full
restoration. Two themes in tius evolving discussion reflect Nock's senti-
ment and appear in the Final Rule: (1) the avoidance of monetizing any
aspect of damages at any stage in the assessment and (2) the focus on
compensating for interim and permanent lost natural resources and services
in the form of additional natural resources and services. NOAA has
assumed the lead in the ongoing natural resource valuation discourse, has
furthered these two themes, and has taken the next step in resolving the
difficult issues. Three aspects of the Final Rule embody a new course of
policy discussion on natural resource damage assessments and warrant
special attention: (1) the elements of economic efficiency and their relation
to trustee flexibility, (2) the evolving role of nonuse values and contingent
valuation, and (3) the progression away from an economic pricing theory
of the valuation of public goods toward a recognition of the public's diver-
sity of incommensurable values of natural resources.
A. The Role of Economic Efficiency and Trustee Flexibility
In determining accurate compensation for accidents under the common
law, two basic components of economic efficiency are typically consid-
228. ALBERT J. NOCK, MEMOIRS OF A SUPERFLUOUS MAN 246 (1943).
229. See Copple, supra note 49, at 675 (noting that NOAA and DOI regimes prefer
restoration as natural resource damages). But see Phillips & Zeckhauser, supra note 19, at
133-36 (arguing that it is economically inefficient to fully restore injured natural resources
and that recovered funds may be better spent on other projects); Williams, supra note 42,
at 375 (noting that "the choice between restoration and diminution m market value measures
continues to dominate public discussion of natural resource valuation").
1545
53 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1513 (1996)
ered.230 Although these traditional components of efficiency are no longer
the guiding principles in developing damage assessment regulations, they
remain relevant.3" First, damage assessment regulations should ensure that
oil polluters fully compensate the public for all harm from the pollution
injury at the lowest possible cost to the polluter. Second, writers of dam-
age assessment regulations should seek to develop an assessment process
that will arrive at the amount of damages necessary to promote proper
efforts at risk management in the oil industry 11 The first goal of perfect
compensation - the indifference of the victim between having the injury
and the compensation, or having never suffered the injury - is key to the
establishment of the second goal of proper risk deterrence. 3  Together, the
two concepts promote the efficient allocation of scarce resources.' A
modem concern is whether trustees can implement efficient compensation
within the restoration framework. 5 Since the rejection of certain common-
law efficiency principles in Ohio, commentators have discussed a "new
economc efficiency" arising from a cost-benefit comparison for each of the
several damage measures. 6  In the Final Rule, NOAA has subordinated
230. See supra notes 42-56 and accompanying text (discussing dual role of economic
efficiency).
231. See Williams, supra note 42, at 384-85 ("Although DOI's initial lesser-of rule was
set aside m Ohio v. United States Department of the Interior as inconsistent with the
purposes of the statute, its internal logic continues to exert powerful influences on the
choices DOI and NOAA have made as they have attempted to fashion NRDA rules.").
232. See Phillips & Zeckhauser, supra note 19, at 139-40 (explaining that optimal
incentives depend on accurate valuation of natural resource injury and that "right assess-
ment" leads to "right incentives").
233. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 45, at 380 (explaining that concept of perfect
compensation based on indifference is fundamental to establishing economic incentives). But
see Cross, supra note 149, at 342-43 (arguing that natural resource damages do not need to
seek deterrence levels because private party claims and criminal and civil penalties function
as effective deterrents); Williams, supra note 42, at 374 (arguing that variety of civil and
criminal sanctions are effective to create incentives and to induce pollution control).
234. See CooTER & ULEN, supra note 45, at 380 (noting that perfect compensation and
risk deterrence are components of any compensatory damages scheme); WARD & DUFFIELD,
supra note 104, §§ 10.2-10.3 (discussing components of optimal allocation of resources and
application of law and economics standard of efficiency to natural resource damages).
235. See Ohio v United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 456 (D.C. Cir.
1989) ("To say that Congress placed a thumb on the scales in favor of restoration is not to
say that it forswore the goal of efficiency "). The court elaborated on the relationship
between efficiency and valuation: "'Efficiency,' standing alone, simply means that the
chosen policy will dictate the result that achieves the greatest value to society Whether a
particular choice is efficient depends on how the various alternatives are valued." 1d.
236. See Copple, supra note 49, at 692-709 (explaining how cost-benefit criteria used
to evaluate potential restoration alternatives create sliding scale of "new economic effi-
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these norms of efficiency to the goals of environmental effectiveness. The
Final Rule advances these goals by elevating the environmental factors over
economic efficiency factors in the selection of a restoration plan and by
increasing the flexibility afforded trustees to confront a diversity of environ-
mental injuries occurring in a diversity of ecosystems.
Like all damage assessment regulations developed after Ohio, the Final
Rule does not contain an explicit grossly disproportionate standard to dictate
when interim lost value trumps restoration costs as the measure of
damages. 7 NOAA states, without substantial justification, that following
the procedures in the Final Rule will ensure that the restoration action is
commensurate with the value of the natural resource losses and, conse-
quently, that no grossly disproportionate standard is needed. 8 Unlike the
existing DOI regulations, NOAA's Final Rule does not replace the grossly
disproportionate standard with an alternative economic efficiency device. 9
However, like the existing DOI rule, the Final Rule employs an approach
that consists of two tiers of criteria that guide the damage assessment. The
first tier consists of certain standards with which all assessment procedures
must comply 24 Under one standard, the trustees must determine that the
ciency").
237 See Faith A. Bulger, The Evolution of the "Grossly Disproportionate" Standard
in Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 45 BAYLOR L. REv 459, 467, 470 (1993) (tracing
meaning and evolution of grossly disproportionate standard in damages assessment regulation
and noting that most recent damage assessment regulations do not contain explicit ratios or
specific grossly disproportionate standards).
238. See Final Rule, supra note 10, at 490 (responding to commenters who encouraged
inclusion of grossly disproportionate standard and stating that "evaluation and selection of
restoration alternatives according to the factors provided in the rule will ensure that pre-
ferred actions are commensurate with the value of natural resource losses").
239 See Copple, supra note 49, at 699-700 (explaining that 10 factors considered in
selecting restoration plan amount to an alternative grossly disproportionate standard). In
support of this proposition, Copple quotes the following passage from DOI's 1991 proposed
rulemaking:
This determination of the relationship of cost to benefits is not an attempt to
define in quantitative terms, as suggested by the court, what costs might be
"grossly disproportionate" to the value of the services lost. Instead, the proposed
revision would require that all of the various factors listed be considered by the
trustee in selecting the most appropriate alternatives for restoration, rehabilita-
tion, replacement, and/or acquisition of equivalent resources. These factors,
when considered together, would encompass the "grossly disproportionate"
determination suggested by the [Ohio] court.
Id. (citing Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 56 Fed. Reg. 19,752, 19,758 (1991)).
240. See supra note 216 and accompanying text (listing and discussing criteria for
assessment procedures from Final Rule).
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additional cost of a more complex procedure is reasonably related to the
increase in quality or quantity of information it will produce." l In addition,
when confronted with two equally effective procedures, the trustees must
select the more cost-effective alternative.24 These two factors promote
economic efficiency at the procedure selection stage by ensuring that the
trustees will not spend additional funds, borne by the polluter and,
ultimately, the public, on costly procedures unless they first determine that
the extra information is worth the added expense.
The second tier consists of criteria used to evaluate all restoration
alternatives when selecting the preferred restoration plan.243 Of the six
factors that the trustees must imtially consider, only one specifically relates
to cost.244 The trustees must consider the "cost to carry out the alterna-
tive," but not in relation to the expected benefits of that plan.245 In con-
trast, the existing DOI regulations and NOAA's 1994 proposed rule contain
241. See Final Rule, supra note 10, at 503 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 927(a)(2))
(stating that "the additional cost of a more complex procedure must be reasonably related
to the expected increase in the quality and/or quantity of relevant information provided by
the more complex procedure").
242. Id. (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 927(c)(2)).
243. See id. at 507-08 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.54(a)-(b)) (listing set of
standards by which to evaluate reasonable range of restoration alternatives). The standards
for selecting the preferred restoration plan are as follows:
(a) Evaluation standards. Once trustees have developed a reasonable range of
restoration alternatives they must evaluate the proposed alternatives based
on, at a nmmum:
(1) The cost to carry out the alternative;
(2) The extent to which each alternative is expected to meet the trustees'
goals and objectives in returning the injured natural resources and services
to baseline and/or compensating for interim losses;
(3) The likelihood of success of each alternative;
(4) The extent to which each alternative will prevent future injury as a result
of the incident, and avoid collateral injury as a result of implementing the
alternative;
(5) The extent to which each alternative benefits more than one natural
resource and/or service; and
(6) The effect of each alternative on public health and safety
(b) Preferred restoration alternatives. Based on an evaluation of the factors under
paragraph (a) of this section, trustees must select a preferred restoration alterna-
tive(s). If the trustees conclude that two or more alternatives are equally prefera-
ble based on these factors, the trustees must select the most cost-effective alterna-
tive.
Id.
244. Id. at 507 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.54(a)(1)).
245. Id.
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explicit requirements that the trustees evaluate the relationship between the
cost and expected benefits of each alternative.246 The remaining five
criteria relate to the "environmental effectiveness" of the restoration alterna-
tives. 247 The trustees will evaluate cost-effectiveness only when they decide
that two or more restoration actions are equally preferable under the pre-
dominantly environmental considerations.24 Because the cost-effectiveness
factor acts only as a tie-breaker between equally environmentally sound
alternatives, trustees may not consider cost-effectiveness at this second
stage. In addition, any requirement to consider the relationship between
costs and benefits (as opposed to cost-effectiveness) is conspicuously
absent.249 The only guaranteed cost-benefit comparison occurs at the pro-
cedure selection stage.
Good or bad, the Final Rule appears to subordinate economic effi-
ciency to the environmental effectiveness critena.Y0  Moreover, it is unclear
whether the selection of economically efficient procedures will translate into
246. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.82(d)(2) (1995) (listing "relationship of the expected costs of
the proposed actions to the expected benefits from the restoration" as one factor that trustees
must consider in selecting among alternatives); 1994 Proposed Rule, supra note 160, at 1134
(to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.75(b)(2)) (listing "[r]elationship of expected costs to
expected benefits" as one factor that trustees must consider in selecting among restoration
alternatives).
247 See Copple, supra note 49, at 704-05 (contrasting "environmental effectiveness"
factors with "relative cost" factors in NOAA's 1994 proposed rule).
248. See Final Rule, supra note 10, at 507-08 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.54(b))
(stating that "i]f the trustees conclude that two or more alternatives are equally preferable
based on these [six] factors, the trustees must select the most cost-effective alternative").
249. See Copple, supra note 49, at 693-94 & n.73 (explaining that cost-benefit consider-
ation is "focal point" of economic efficiency, rather than simple cost or cost-effectiveness
considerations).
250. See d. at 693 & n33 (explaining that in existing DOI regulations, comparison of
expected costs to expected benefits is primary promoter of economic efficiency). Copple
adds that cost-effectiveness is limited to a strict comparison of two equal alternatives and
that the cost-benefit consideration is the factor that produces economic efficiency Id. at
693-94. In contrast, the preamble to the Final Rule offers an ambiguous explanation of the
restoration selection factors. After listing the six primary factors, none of which refer to
cost-efficiency or cost-benefit relationships, NOAA states:
When selecting a restoration alternative, trustees should consider the relationship
between costs and benefits. However, reducing the selection process to a strict
comparison of restoration costs to monetized natural resource values is not
required and may not be appropriate. Instead, the rule requires trustees to
evaluate each alternative according to the factors listed above and identify a
preferred alternative. NOAA believes this approach provides adequate protection
against selection of an inappropriately costly alternative.
Final Rule, supra note 10, at 454.
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overall economic efficiency sI Some commentators have argued that the
emphasis on restoration is inherently less efficient than a monetized measure
of damages."52 Thus, the replacement of the only remaining monetized
portion of damages with compensatory restoration will further reduce the
economic efficiency of the assessments conducted under the Final Rule.
The second major detraction from economic efficiency in the Final
Rule results from the increased trustee flexibility and consequent uncer-
tainty Increased uncertainty thwarts the goals of economic efficiency by
removing predictability from damage figures and hindering the ability of
potential polluters to internalize their cost of risk avoidance."53 A primary
contributor to uncertain outcomes in the Final Rule is the variety of provi-
sions granting trustees increased discretion.' First, the Final Rule offers
minimal guidance as to which valuation procedures trustees should use.' s
The major constraint on procedure selection is that all procedures must be
"reliable and valid." 6 Yet NOAA fails to define the terms "reliable and
valid" and allows the trustees to make that determination relatively free of
guidance.57 Second, although NOAA introduces the new idea of compen-
satory restoration, it offers little instruction on how to determine compensa-
tory restoration. 8 NOAA's preference for the service-to-service ap-
251. See Williams, supra note 42, at 431-33 (discussing how "relative cost" factor m
selecting restoration alternative in existing DOI rule and in original NOAA proposal
promotes efficiency m economic pricing).
252. See Phillips & Zeckhauser, supra note 19, at 133-39 (arguing that restoration is
inherently inefficient because marginal costs exceed marginal benefits at point before full
restoration).
253. See d. at 125-28 (explaining relationship of uncertainty and efficiency and noting
that absence of explicit guidance will lead to lengthy and expensive litigation m many cases).
254. See Final Rule, supra note 10, at 478 (stating public comment that "the rule
provides so little meaningful restraint on trustee discretion" that limiting judicial review to
record review is "patently unfair").
255. See Mazzotta et al., supra note. 69, at 166 (arguing that it is important to have
established assessment procedures because lack of guidance will complicate and lengthen
assessment process); see also supra notes 215-20 and accompanying text (discussing criteria
in 15 C.F.R. § 990.27 with which all assessment procedures must comply).
256. Final Rule, supra note 10, at 503 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.27(a)(3)); see
also id. at 487 (explaining that standards in 15 C.F.R. § 990.27 are main constraints in
selecting assessment procedures).
257 See id. at 464 (responding to commenter's suggestion that "reliable and valid" be
defined). NOAA declined the invitation to define "reliable and valid" and defers to experts'
judgments that the selected procedures are consistent with the "best technical practices."
Id.
258. See Copple, supra note 25, at 10,677 (discussing inherent problems in 1995
proposed rule and noting that "by failing to provide real limits or science-based protocols
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proaches is clear, but the explanations of those procedures are more con-
ceptual than functional. 9 Third, the Final Rule gives trustees great discre-
tion in settling damage claims? 6 The trustees may settle the claun at any
time during the assessment process if they determine that the settlement
satisfies the goals of OPA and is "fair, reasonable, and in the public mter-
est." The increase m trustee flexibility and discretion is likely to result
in an increase in challenges by responsible parties to the exercise of that
discretion. 2 Consequently, NOAA may expect continued high transaction
and litigation costs, unpredictable damage amounts, and therefore a less
economically efficient process.' This result is inconsistent with the Final
Rule's explicit goal of reducing transaction costs.'
In the Final Rule, NOAA subordinates the goals of economic effi-
ciency to the goal of making the environment and the public whole and
provides the natural resource trustees with flexibility to approach a variety
of spill conditions. It is unclear whether the new approach can produce
economically efficient solutions, under traditional standards, with any
degree of uniformity in light of: (1) the downplaying of cost-benefit analy-
sis as a factor in selecting the ultimate restoration action and (2) the level
for equivalency analyses or valuation methods, NOAA is providing trustees with incredible
flexibility in establishing compensatory restoration claims" and that "[tlhis lack of standards
will, by itself, greatly increase the likelihood that assessments will be vigorously contested at
both administrative and judicial levels").
259. See Final Rule, supra note 10, at 453 (describing service-to-service approaches as
"obtaining equivalencies" and discounting for differences in time). In fairness to NOAA, the
Final Rule does recommend the use of HEA in the service-to-service approaches. Id. How-
ever, that method is relatively unexplained in the Final Rule. Id. But see id. at 488 (arguing
that Final Rule adequately specifies conditions in which trustees may use valuation approach).
260. See d. at 503 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.25) (allowing trustees to settle at
any time in assessment process).
261. See id. at 446, 463, 503 (explaining trustee discretion m deciding to settle).
262. See Mazzotta et al., supra note 69, at 166 ("It is particularly important to have
established techniques for use in natural resource damage assessment, where lack of guidance
may complicate and lengthen the negotiation process.").
263. It is well recognized that high transaction costs are an impediment to effective
restoration and environmental policy m general. See Phillips & Zeckhauser, supra note 19,
at 124 (noting that "[t]ransaction costs prevent market bargains about natural resource injury
from being struck between those engaged in activities that threaten injuries and those who wish
to preserve resources. Hence, there is no market price for natural resource injuries.").
264. See Final Rule, supra note 10, at 440-41 (listing reduction of transaction costs as
goal of Final Rule and reasoning that because assessments will be conducted with public and
responsible party involvement "it is expected that restoration will be achieved more quickly,
transaction costs will decrease, and litigation will be avoided"); Copple, supra note 25, at
10,677 (noting that NOAA did not intend to continue escalation of transaction costs).
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of uncertainty, indicative of most natural resource damage assessment
schemes, that is heightened in the Final Rule.
B. The Lngerng Role for Nonuse Values and Contingent Valuation
The policy debate over the measurement of nonuse values in assessing
damages to natural resources will not produce a resolution in the near
future.' Until more extensive collaboration between the environmental
and social sciences produces a better understanding of nonuse values,
contingent valuation will remain the only recogmzed method for assessing
those intangibles.' Although the controversy over contingent valuation
continues, 7 NOAA has adopted an assessment procedure that nunmizes
both the role that contingent valuation may play in an assessment and its
inflationary tendencies once employed. The Final Rule sets up a hierarchy
of assessment methods that allows for infrequent resort to explicit monetary
valuation of nonuse values and use of contingent valuation.5 8 Such a
265. See Phillips & Zeckhauser, supra note 19, at 143 (noting that economists have
been unable to develop reliable technique for distinguishing and accounting for nonuse
values).
266. See id. at 142 (noting that contingent valuation is only valuation method considered
to measure nonuse values, but that even CV's precision, reliability, and bias are question-
able); Stewart et al., supra note 22, at 165 (stating that "CVM is the only methodology
recognized for assessing nonuse values").
267 See Stewart et al., supra note 22, at 166 (noting that use of CV is single most
controversial issue in natural resource damage assessment debate); see also Dobbins, supra
note 20, at 921-33 (outlining economic and legal criticisms of CV). As used in this Note,
the "controversy" surrounding contingent valuation refers to the criticisms surrounding its
use to measure nonuse values. Some commentators have highlighted the main economic
criticisms associated with contingent valuation: (1) "indifference to quantity" - meaning
respondent's values do not correspond to the quantity of injured resources; (2) "embed-
ding" - meaning that individuals will express their value derived from the environment as
a whole and not the specific resource injured; (3) "sequence" - meaning that values are
overly dependent on the Injured resource's proximity and sequence with other resources;
(4) lack of budget constraints on willingness to pay hypothetical dollars; (5) large variations
in value for small variations in the survey instrument; (6) "bimodal responses" - meaning
that most responses are either zero or an enormous number; and (7) "implausibly high
responses." Dobbins, supra note 20, at 923-29; Stewart et al., supra note 22, at 168. The
legal criticisms include: (1) that CV's complexity and uncertainty complicate the legal
process and (2) that CV is not reliable enough to comply with the rules of evidence regard-
ing admissibility Dobbins, supra note 20, at 929-33. The practical concern is CV's
tendency to produce "enormous" awards. Id. at 933-35; see also Williams, supra note 42,
at 401 (stating that main criticism of CV is that participants are not required to "put their
money where their mouth is"). See generally NOAA CV Study, supra note 86 (providing
detailed discussion of pros and cons of contingent valuation).
268. See Copple, supra note 25, at 10,675-76 (identifying "three-part hierarchy of
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hierarchy is reminiscent of DOI's 1986 regulation that was rejected in the
Ohio decision. 9 Although Congress sought to incorporate the Ohio court's
rejection of that hierarchy when it passed OPA, NOAA's new assessment
method hierarchy is nonetheless valid under Ohio and capable of accounting
for lost nonuse values through compensatory restoration.20
In the Final Rule, NOAA strongly prefers that natural resource trustees
implement compensatory restoration consisting of resources of the same
type and quality as those lost.27' In scaling that compensation, the Final
Rule requires that trustees consider the service-to-service approaches.27
Only if the trustees determine that using replacement resources of the same
type and quality is infeasible or that the service-to-service approaches are
not appropriate can they scale the compensation using a valuation ap-
proach.' The Final Rule suggests -contingent valuation as one method of
the valuation approach.274 If valuation would be costly or unreasonably
time consuming, the trustees may then resort to a monetary valuation of the
injury and provide compensation based on that dollar amount.275 This
assessment method hierarchy, like its predecessor in DOI's original regula-
tions, prefers assessment methods that do not explicitly account for nonuse
values .276
At first glance, this new assessment method hierarchy seems to offend
congressional intent that OPA embody the Ohio court's reasoning concern-
ing nonuse valuation.27 Although Congress expressed a strong preference
methods" m scaling approach in NOAA's 1995 proposed rule).
269. See supra notes 68-127 and accompanying text (discussing initial DOI regulations
and court decision invalidating those regulations).
270. See supra notes 188-95 and accompanying text (discussing concept of compensa-
tory restoration).
271. Final Rule, supra note 10, at 507 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(c)(2)).
272. Id. at 507 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(d)). NOAA recommends use of
Habitat Equivalency Analysis, which is based on the creation of a direct equivalency
between injured and replacement resources, as the preferred method in the service-to-service
approaches. Id. at 453.
273. Id.
274. See ud. (noting that variety of valuation procedures includes "travel cost method,
factor income approach, hedonic price models, models of market supply and demand,
contingent valuation, and conjoint analysis"); see also infra notes 304-05 (discussing Final
Rule's preference for using contingent valuation without using monetary metric).
275. Id. at 507 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(d)(3)).
276. See supra notes 83-87, 109-15, and accompanying text (discussing DOI's 1986
regulation's hierarchy of assessment methods and court's rejection of subordination of
nonuse values).
277 See S. REP. No. 101- 94, at 15 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 737
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for restoration as the measure of damages, it instructed NOAA to issue
regulations to measure interim diminution in value in the manner intended
by the D C. Circuit.27 The Ohio court explicitly rejected an assessment
method hierarchy that tended to exclude nonuse values?279 That court held
that nonuse values are an essential component m measuring diminution m
value and one that trustees must consider in order to make the public
whole.' In addition, the court rejected the industry petitioners' challenge
to the use of contingent valuation and upheld that method as a best available
procedure." Given that contingent valuation is the only recogmzed method
for determiung nonuse values and that it rests at the bottom of NOAA's
new hierarchy of assessment approaches, it is difficult to reconcile this
hierarchy with Congress's express intent that compensation for diminution
m value account for nonuse values. One ught conclude that if the natural
resource trustees follow the Final Rule's hierarchy, nonuse values will be
considered only to the extent that compensatory resources of the same type
and quality are not available.'
However, in a scheme based on compensatory restoration and the
service-to-service approaches, natural resource trustees may be able to
acueve the congressional objectives without explicit measurement of nonuse
("This bill as amended is intended to be consistent with the recent unanimous decisions [in
Ohio] reversing the Interior Department's narrow market value and use value based
approach to assessing damages "); supra notes 93-115 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Ohio court's finding congressional preference for restoration and inclusion of nonuse
values).
278. See H.R. CONF REP No. 101-653, at 108, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779,
786 ("Diminution of value refers to the standard for measuring natural resource damages
used in the recent D.C. Circuit Court decision "). The purpose of compensatory
restoration is to provide for interim diminution in value. Compensable value, the original
NRDA concept, and its replacement, compensatory restoration, are both rooted in the
provision of OPA that includes interim diminution in value as a component of damages. See
Final Rule, supra note 10, at 474 (noting that both compensable value and compensatory
restoration are rooted in OPA damages provision).
279 See Ohio v United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 464 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (instructing DOI that its exclusion of nonuse values "rests on an erroneous construc-
tion of the statute").
280. See d. at 464, 476-77 (interpreting CERCLA to require inclusion of nonuse values
in NRDAs in most, if not all, circumstances); Stewart et al., supra note 22, at 166 (noting
that Ohio court required that passive use values be included m calculation of lost value).
281. Ohio, 880 F.2d at 474-78.
282. See Final Rule, supra note 10, at 507 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(c)(2))
(directing trustees to first consider replacement resources of same type and quality); 1d. (to
be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(d)(2)) (directing trustees to use service-to-service
approaches for replacement resources of same type and quality).
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values.m Compensatory or resource-based compensation is premised on
the idea that, aside from the primary restoration action, trustees can com-
pensate the public for interim diminution in value by providing or unprov-
ing other natural resources of the same type and quantity as those lost.u'
In determining what level of resources to provide, trustees will focus on the
services that the injured resource produced and attempt to provide addi-
tional resources that produce those same services.' The Final Rule's
concept of services includes direct services and the nonuse values provided
by those services.' Under the service-to-service approaches, trustees
strike a balance between lost human and ecological services and replace-
ment services of the same type and quality.' 7 Thus, trustees account for
and replace the nonuse values that are bound up in the human and ecologi-
cal services without expressly measuring or monetizing them. 8 In re-
sponse to public comments on the defintion of services, NOAA made it
clear that "compensable services include both direct and passive uses, and
that the rule provides for recovery of both."2"9
Accepting that compensatory restoration based on the service-to-service
approaches can implicitly account for nonuse values, the next question is
whether an implicit accounting of nonuse values is valid under OPA's
mandate. Or, on the other hand, did the Ohio court and Congress, in
283. See Dennis M. King, Econonucs of Ecological Restoration, in NATURAL RESOURCE
DAMAGES: LAW AND EcONOMIcs 493, 494 (Kevin M. Ward & John W Duffield eds.,
1992) (noting that trustees can avoid valuation problems by using physical or biological
indicators instead of dollars m restoration).
284. See generally Mazzotta et al., supra note 69 (proposing, outlining, and applying
resource-based compensation scheme).
285. See Final Rule, supra note 10, at 452 (explaining compensatory restoration as
providing "services of the same type and quality, and of comparable value as those in-
jured").
286. See Stewart et al., supra note 22, at 161 (suggesting that focus on replacing natural
resource services will account for "preservation and other nonuse values").
287 Final Rule, supra note 10, at 507 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(d)(2)).
288. See Cross, supra note 149, at 333 (stating that restoration can embrace nonuse as
well as use values, perhaps better than contingent valuation).
289 Final Rule, supra note 10, at 475; see id. at 486 (responding to comments on role
of passive use values). NOAA outlined its view of passive use values in the Final Rule:
Where appropriate, NOAA supports the inclusion of reliably calculated passive
use values in the scaling process. NOAA notes that some of the commenters'
concern about inclusion of passive use losses may have been addressed by
defining compensation for interin losses in terms of the cost of compensatory
restoration actions rather than as the value of interim losses In this case
it is not necessary to elicit a monetary value for natural resources.
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passing OPA, truly require explicit monetization of nonuse values by using
contingent valuation?2" Congress did not express a preference for moneti-
zation of a compensable value. In fact, when referring to the Ohio deci-
sion, Congress's primary concern was that OPA should be consistent with
the court's rejection of valuation based solely on market and use values.29
The rejection of monetization based exclusively on market values reveals
only an intent that the responsible parties restore the full value of natural
resources. The D C. Circuit specifically stated, as Congress was aware,
that many scholars are skeptical of the ability to monetize natural resource
values.292
Although compensatory restoration can account for nonuse values and
is valid under OPA, the new approach is not without potential flaws. One
such flaw is that adherence to the service-to-service approaches may skew
the use of the public trust doctrine to make the injured party whole.2' The
Final Rule instructs trustees, in the context of scaling, to determine com-
pensatory restoration based on the replacement of ecological as well as
human services. 2' The potential exists that trustees will focus unduly on
the lost services that the injured resource provided to the surrounding
resources and the ecosystem, rather than on the loss to the public.295
Although the public trust doctrine has grown to protect environmental
values, 296 it remains a theory of protection of the public interest, aimed at
290. See Denis Swords, Note, Ohio v United States Department of the Interior: A
Contingent Step Forward for Environmentalists, 51 LA. L. REv 1347, 1348 (1991) (noting
that court effectively mandated use of contingent valuation in all damage assessments
because trustees can only determine nonuse values with that method).
291. S. REP No. 101-94, at 15 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 737
292. See Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 457 & n.40 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (noting that CERCLA text and legislative history suggest that Congress and many
scholars were skeptical of ability to measure true value of natural resources).
293. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (1994) (codifying public trust doctrine and providing
for "public trustees"); see also 33 U.S.C. § 2706(b)(1) (1994) (designating trustees to "act
on behalf of the public").
294. See Final Rule, supra note 10, at 505 (defining services as "functions performed
by a natural resource for the benefit of another natural resource"). The Final Rule defines
ecological services as "physical, chemical, or biological functions that one natural resource
provides for another"). Id. at 448; see also Williams, supra note 42, at 414-15 (explaining
that concept of services includes services other than those to humans).
295. See Final Rule, supra note 10, at 475 (responding to commenters' opinions that
compensatory restoration is too focused on replacing ecological services, NOAA argues that
"humans and other species in the ecosystem are inextricably linked"). NOAA further argues
that it will be more effective to account for ecological services at the site of the resource
rather than indirect human services at a point distant from the resource. Id.
296. See WARD & DUFFmLD, supra note 104, § 2.3 (noting that courts have expanded
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safeguarding the public's use (and nonuse) of natural resources. 2' Techm-
cal implementation of compensatory restoration based on replacing services,
including ecological services, may result in a restoration plan that endeavors
to make the environment whole, which ignores the trustees' true purpose
under the public trust doctrine - to make the public whole.29
In addition, the concept of compensatory restoration as compensation
for interim diminution of nonuse values contains an internal inconsistency
Often, a portion of the nonuse value of a natural resource exists in the
public's appreciation of the umqueness of that resource.2 To the extent
that a resource's nonuse value derives from its uniqueness, replacement
resources cannot compensate the public for that loss. Essential to the
concept of a unique good is the complete lack of adequate substitutes.3"°
This absence of adequate substitutes means that the replacement of natural
resources cannot make the public whole.
A third potential flaw arises when one views primary and compensa-
tory restoration together. If primary restoration returns the injured natural
resource to its baseline condition, then compensatory restoration may
involve restoring that resource to a state "above" its natural baseline condi-
tion. In contrast, previous damage assessment regulations required that
trustees not restore the resource to a condition above its baseline level.30'
public trust doctrine to protect variety of public uses of natural resources, including
preservation of environment).
297 See Mazzotta et al., supra note 69, at 165 ("Under the public trust doctrine, the
trustee acts on behalf of the public interest in natural resource amenities, not on behalf of
the resource itself."); WARD & DUFFIELD, supra note 104, § 2.3 (describing public trust
doctrine by reference to public uses of environment).
298. See Mazzotta et al., supra note 69, at 165-66 (explaining that under public trust
doctrine, trustees should act on behalf of public interest and resist tendency to act "on behalf
of the resource itself" when conducting restoration based on equivalency of resources or
services); Phillips & Zeckhauser, supra note 19, at 145-46 (noting that nature does not have
standing legally or economically and that individuals are proper basis for cost-benefit
comparisons and welfare economics m general).
299. See A. Myrick Freeman, III, Nonuse Values in Natural Resource Damage Assess-
ment, in VALUING NATURAL ASSETS: THE ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE
ASSESSMENT 264, 298 (Raymond J. Kopp & V Kerry Smith eds., 1993) (noting nonuse
values can arise from uniqueness of natural resource, which presents additional problem of
accounting for absence of substitutes).
300. See Copple, supra note 25, at 10,677 (noting that "concepts of replaceable services
and unique aesthetic values somehow seem incongruent and deserve further attention").
301. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.82(d)(2)(i) (1987) (directing that range of restoration alterna-
tives should restore "lost services to no more than their baseline level"); id. § 11.82(b)(1)(iii)
(1995) (limiting restoration alternatives to those that restore resources to "no more than their
baseline").
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The wisdom of tampering with and elevating the natural state of the envi-
ronment is questionable and could be counterproductive.3°2
Although the explicit consideration of nonuse values and the use of
contingent valuation will be infrequent, those concepts still have roles in
damage assessments conducted under the Final Rule. However, when
natural resource trustees use contingent valuation in the context of the
valuation approach, it will operate differently from the traditional and
controversial view of that method."3 Instead of surveying individuals about
the monetary value of the resource, the contingent valuation survey will
seek to determine what level of replacement resources will equal the lost
resources and thus make the public whole - the surveys will ask respon-
dents to value their feelings for natural resources in terms of other natural
resources." 5 In fact, the Final Rule avoids the monetization of nonuse
values and the inaccuracy associated with converting those uncertain values
into dollars.3"
In addition, the Final Rule may deny trustees the ability to resort to
contingent valuation altogether. NOAA has directed that all assessment
procedures "must be reliable and valid for the particular incident."307 Since
the Ohio decision, legal and economic commentators have come forward
and strongly argued that contingent valuation is neither reliable nor valid. 0
302. See Cross, supra note 149, at 333-39 (arguing that achieving exact replication, or
more, of environment is "artificial, ineffective, or even counterproductive").
303. See supra note 267 (outlining controversy surrounding use of contingent valuation).
304. See Final Rule, supra note 10, at 442 (noting that "possible use of contingent
valuation (CV) and other stated-preference methods of valuation to determine what scale of
compensatory restoration provides an equivalent value to the lost services avoids many
problems identified by commenters regarding the use of CV to calculate a dollar value for
the damages as included in the 1994 proposal"). NOAA also states that:
Furthermore, in the revised format for claims, valuation procedures, including stated
preference methods [such as CV], are used to make relative comparisons between the
loss and the compensatory restoration action gains, rather than to generate absolute
dollar amounts of lost value for a claim. Scaling compensatory restoration actions
may involve a single survey eliciting the direct resource-to-resource trade offs
between the injured natural resources and potential compensatory natural resources.
Id. at 486.
305. See Cross, supra note 149, at 329-30 (noting that most people are unaccustomed
to thinking about resources in economic terms).
306. See Final Rule, supra note 10, at 453 (allowing trustees to calculate monetary
values only if other methods are too costly or time consuming or if responsible parties so
request).
307 Id. at 503 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.27(a)(3)).
308. See Binger et al., supra note 86, at 1108 (concluding that further research is
necessary before undue reliance on largely experimental contingent valuation method);
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In fact, immediately after the publication of the Final Rule, the oil industry
expressed confident optimism that the reliable and valid requirement could
be used to keep contingent valuation out of damage assessments alto-
gether.3°9 This issue is further complicated by NOAA's leaving those key
terms - reliable and valid - undefined m the Final Rule. 10 Consequently,
the roles for contingent valuation and the monetization of nonuse values m
the Final Rule are either repressed or nonexistent.31' Responsible parties
should be aware, however, that trustees may use or at least threaten to use
contingent valuation to encourage an early out-of-court settlement. 1 2
The measurement of nonuse values and the role of contingent valuation
have been a focal point of the public discourse on damage assessments since
the court of appeal's ruling in Ohio. In the Final Rule, NOAA has created
a hierarchy of assessment methods that results in infrequent use of contin-
gent valuation and explicit measuring of nonuse values. Nonetheless,
NOAA has ensured that trustees will compensate the public for nonuse
values and make the public whole in a compensatory restoration scheme
based on replacement of injured services with services of the same type and
quality When trustees employ a contingent valuation survey to measure
nonuse values, they modify that method to value the injured resources in
terms of replacement resources. NOAA has crafted a creative solution to
the controversy surrounding nonuse values and the potentially inflationary
Cross, supra note 149, at 328-33 (arguing that "reliance upon contingent valuation would
be erroneous" and that "contingent valuation has serious shortcomings that counsel against
its widespread use"); supra note 267 (describing economic and legal criticism of contingent
valuation).
309. See Kimberley Music, Industry Sees Hope in Changes Planned for Assessment
Rule, OIL DAILY, Jan. 8, 1996, at 1 ("While it still is possible that an attempt would be
made to use a formula or contingent valuation, those methods would have to be shown to
be 'reliable and valid,' the source said, and the oil industry is pretty confident that neither
of the two [i.e.,valuation formulas or contingent valuation] can ever be shown to be reliable
and valid.") (quoting oil industry official).
310. See Final Rule, supra note 10, at 464 (noting that term "reliable and valid" is not
defined m Final Rule, but deferring to technical judgments by experts).
311. The counterargument - that contingent valuation is reliable and valid - may be
supported by (1) the NOAA CV Study that cautiously endorsed a restricted use of contingent
valuation, supra note 86, and (2) the fact that NOAA listed that method m an appendix to
the Final Rule. See Final Rule, supra note 10, at 449 app. B.
312. See Kopp et al., supra note 29, at 10,131 (noting that "[i]t should come as no
surprise that the position of trustees in negotiating out-of-court settlements has been consid-
erably strengthened" by approval of contingent valuation in Ohio); Richard C. Paddock,
How Much Is a River Worth? Assessing Damage in the Dunsmuir Spill, 14 CAL. LAW. 33,
34 (1994) (noting that possibility of using passive use values "can serve as leverage to bring
the responsible parties to a negotiated settlement").
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bias of contingent valuation," 3 and thus realized that nonuse values are only
important to the extent that they aid the trustees in determining the total
value of the lost resource." 4 The Final Rule aims to gauge the total value
of natural resources and make the public whole while avoiding the
controversies associated with natural resource valuation.
C. The Fundamental Progression of Natural Resource Valuation Theory
In the larger evolution of natural resource policy, the significance of
NOAA's Final Rule goes beyond the subordination of economic efficiency
and the circumvention of the controversy surrounding nonuse values and
contingent valuation. The Final Rule reflects a theoretical progression away
from the primarily economic pricing of natural resources toward a broader
recognition of the diverse ways that people value the environment. 15 At
the traditional end of this theoretical spectrum, economists rely heavily on
market-based theories and methods to account for the lack of market
assistance in pricing natural resources. Under this theory, natural resource
trustees attempt to supply market mechanisms to determine how people
would behave if natural resources were exchanged with a uniform currency
Commodifying natural resource values promotes utility maxinization and
risk deterrence." 6 At the other end of this spectrum, a contrasting valua-
tion theory emphasizes the plurality of "kinds"317 of value and the inability
of a market-based model to capture all the ways that people value natural
313. Several commenters noted that the compensatory restoration approach is "an
attempt to circumvent the difficulties m accurately measuring mterim lost values." Final
Rule, supra note 10, at 484. Although this comment is accurate, we should not fault NOAA
for avoiding controversy as long as trustees can still make the public whole.
314. See Freeman, supra note 299, at 299 (urging more focus on total values).
Freeman states: "I urge that we not accept uncritically the present conventions for distin-
guishmg between use and nonuse values. Ultimately, for policy purposes or for determining
compensation, we want to be able to measure total value. Any distinction between use and
nonuse values is itself useful only if it helps m the task of measuring total values." Id.
315. See Williams, supra note 42, passim (juxtaposing pricing and corrective justice
theories of natural resource valuation); see generally Cass R. Sunstem, Incommensurability
and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REv 779 (1994) (addressing problem of valuing all
goods along single metric). Professor Sunstem discusses the inadequacy of a single method
of valuing goods and describes incommensurability as "when the relevant goods cannot be
aligned along a single metric without doing violence to our considered judgments about how
these goods are best characterized." Id. at 796.
316. See supra notes 42-56 and accompanying text (discussing traditional components
of economic efficiency m measurement of damage).
317 See Sunstem, supra note 315, at 795 (noting that debate in valuing certain goods
should be about appropriate "kinds" rather than "levels" of valuation).
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resources. If we accept that these values are not convertible to a common
currency, the econonuc efficiency goals are much less relevant. The disso-
nance of these opposing theories appears in many contexts,3 8 but is espe-
cially evident in the context of valuing damages to natural resources and
crafting damage assessment regulations. 319 NOAA's Final Rule is a step m
a continuing progression toward a noneconomic or "corrective justice"
theory of natural resource valuation.3 20
Nonuse values of natural resources that the federal government regu-
lates and protects are a form of pure public good and thus are not subject
to the market forces associated with private property rights.321 The market
pncing theory behind measuring natural resource values is built on the idea
that trustees can determine the precise value of natural resources by creating
pricing models that employ a uniform metric.3" When values are not
readily ascertainable by reference to a market, an indirect or hypothetical
market is supplied with the goal of achieving monetized values. 32  Thus,
economists attempt to remove the market failures associated with public
goods to determine how the public would value the resource if traded in
market transactions. Toward this end, damage assessment regulations seek
to identify, analyze, and aggregate individual preferences to obtain a
monetized value. Under this market-based pricing theory, damage assess-
ments will only account for those nonuse values that are capable of transla-
tion into a willingness to pay for the natural resource.324 By using a single
318. See id. at 824-53 (discussing incommensurability theory in nine different legal
contexts).
319. See Williams, supra note 42, at 384 (noting that "tension between corrective
justice and pricing rhetoric has been particularly noticeable as DOI and NOAA have
attempted to fashion these rules").
320. The term "corrective justice" as used m this Note refers to the "particularized con-
ception" of that term developed by Professor Douglas Williams in Valuing Natural Environ-
ments: Compensation, Market Norms, and the Idea of Public Goods, supra note 42. This
section builds on Professor Williams's contrast of the pricing rhetoric and corrective justice
models of natural resource valuation, but does not adopt Professor Williams's conclusions.
321. See Kopp & Smith, supra note 74, at 16-19 (explaining concept of pure public
goods and noting problems of valuing public goods and nonuse value); see generally Daniel
S. Levy & David Fnedman, The Revenge of the Redwoods? Reconsidering Property Rights
and the Economic Allocation of Natural Resources, 61 U. Cm. L. REV 493 (1994) (arguing
from premise that market valuation fails for goods that are not freely substitutable).
322. See Williams, supra note 42, at 367-69 (noting that parameters of pricing rhetoric
approach are based on market norms and traditional concerns with efficiency).
323. See Phillips & Zeckhauser, supra note 19, at 140-51 (explaining that economic
approach to valuing natural resources is based on observing market transactions or on
constructing hypothetical market transactions for intangible goods not traded in markets).
324. See id. at 141-42 (explaining that as long as someone is willing to give up some-
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metric of valuation, natural resource trustees can compare costs and benefits
and work to implement economically efficient outcomes, maximizing social
utility and deterring risks.3'
Damage assessment regulations have generally contained two products
of this economic pricing theory of valuation: (1) the emphasis on monetiza-
tion of damage figures evident in the concept of "compensable value" and
(2) the use of economic models to determine the true value of nonmarket
resources." Although the primary component of natural resource damages
since Ohio has been restoration cost, trustees have also been able to recover
a compensable value - a diminution in value pending resource restora-
tion. 27 This concept reflects the idea that the public can and should be
compensated in the form of money for lost values of a natural resource
pending restoration.32 To monetize use and nonuse values, the damage
assessment regulations offered trustees a variety of economic methods, all
aimed at determining the public's aggregate willingness to pay for natural
resources.329 Contingent valuation is an archetypal economic pricing device
that asks survey respondents in a hypothetical market to place a monetary
value on their intangible feelings about the injured natural resource.330
thing for nonuse values they are real values and should be included in damage assessment).
325. See WARD & DUFFIELD, supra note 104, §§ 10.2-10.3 (noting that much of natural
resource theory surrounds narrow goal of efficient allocation of resources based on units of
individual welfare).
326. See Williams, supra note 42, passim (arguing that monetization, market models,
and concept of compensable value are based on pricing theory that fails to account for true
value of natural resources).
327 See 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c) (1995) (defining compensable value as "amount of
money required to compensate the public for the loss in services provided by the injured
resources"); see also supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text (discussing compensable
value).
328. See Mazzotta et al., supra note 69, at 168 (noting that compensable value determi-
nation involves the complicated step of asking people to place dollar values on natural
resources).
329. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c)(2) (1995) (listing "valuation methodologies" to estimate
"willingness to pay"); see also Mazzotta et al., supra note 69, at 166-67 (explaining that
"compensable value" is based on calculating monetary well-being before and after natural
resource injury); Williams, supra note 42, at 385 (arguing that pricing rhetoric introduces
enormous difficulties in valuation yet "DOI and NOAA have stubbornly and persistently
adhered to its basic logic as a foundation on which to build appropriate valuation tech-
niques").
330. See Levy & Friedman, supra note 321, at 496 (noting that contingent valuation is
alternative to market methods to determine public's willingness to pay for intangible
qualities of natural resources).
1562
NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS
A chief criticism of valuing natural resources under an economic
pricing theory is that it disregards the multiple ways that the public values
natural resources, many of which cannot be translated into a desire to pay
or receive money. 3 1 Implicit in this criticism is the idea that the process
of reducing nonuse values to a willingness to pay inevitably distorts the true
value. 32 Economic pricing accounts for the stated preferences of mdividu-
als while ignoring the reasons for, and sources of, those preferences. In
contrast, the corrective justice theory focuses on and promotes recognition
of the multiple and nonquantifiable ways in which humans value natural
resources.3" One example of an alternative source of value is the value
derived from strongly held ethical beliefs that humans have a duty to
protect the natural environment.3 5 A theory based on economic pricing can
capture these ethical values only to the extent that individuals are willing
to support them with cash. An unappealing corollary to this idea is that
331. See Williams, supra note 42, at 378 (stating that "[tihe importation of market
norms into the sphere of publicly managed natural environments goes a long way down the
path to dissolving the institutional lines that protect the plurality of ways m which natural
environments are valued"); see also Phillips & Zeckhauser, supra note 19, at 143 (arguing
that some nonuse values, such as "'warm glow' from doing something good for the environ-
ment" should not be considered true values but that CV may not be able to distinguish
untrue values).
332. See Donald H. Rosenthal & Robert H. Nelson, Why Existence Value Should Not
Be Used in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 11 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 116, 117 (1992) (noting
that accurate measurement of nonuse values may be impossible because trying to measure
nonuse value changes that value). Some commentators argue that when people are asked
about nonuse values, they discover them. Id., see also Sunstem, supra note 315, at 784-85
(arguing that reduction of valuation to single "superconcept" like utility, "produces signifi-
cant loss because it yields an inadequate description of our actual valuations when things are
going well").
333. See Sunstem, supra note 315, at 794 (arguing that "idea of 'revealed preferences'
is a predictive failure; to make predictions from choices, we need to offer an account of
what lies behind choices"). Professor Williams argues that "tallying up of individual
willingness-to-pay offers no opportunity for citizens to articulate reasons for protecting
natural environments, nor does it offer an opportunity for citizens to share in and respect
the values of other citizens; it is an anonymous process that encourages unreflective and
uncritical responses, based on untested beliefs." Williams, supra note 42, at 476.
334. See Williams, supra note 42, at 375-77 (explaining that corrective justice theory
is based on "a plurality of substantive conceptions of why natural environments are valu-
able").
335. But see Phillips & Zeckhauser, supra note 19, at 143 (arguing that value derived
from justice and reverence for environment are values of environment as whole, not
particular resource inlured). Phillips and Zeckhauser conclude that an individual's ethical
values for the environment as a whole are not lost in a specific natural resource mjury and
thus, trustees should not consider them in damage assessments. Id.
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individuals are entitled to their ethical values only to the extent that they
can afford to pay for them.
336
The designation of restoration costs as the primary measure of damages
is the product of a corrective justice theory of natural resource valuation.337
The trustees seek to make the public whole by maintaimng the natural
metric and restoring the resource to its pre-mjury condition. 338 The empha-
sis on restoration is one manifestation of the corrective justice theory's
larger conceptual yield - social responsibility 339 Instead of expecting
monetary compensation from those who pollute or destroy our natural
assets, we can expect the polluter to assume the responsibility to restore the
environment and the public to the pre-injury condition.' This theory
replaces an economic equilibrium between the public and the polluter with
a moral equilibrium based on a plurality of values." Corrective justice
prevails over distributive justice.342
As suggested above, NOAA and DOI have endorsed the corrective
justice theory m their damage assessment regulations to a certain degree. 343
For example, both CERCLA and OPA regulations employ restoration costs
as the presumptive measure of damages and mandate that trustees use all
sums recovered to enhance the environment.' However, NOAA's Final
Rule furthers the movement of environmental policy toward this socially
336. See Williams, supra note 42, at 368-69 (finding it "alarming" that market norm
approach only gauges social and ethical values as long as they are backed by cash).
337 See id. at 371 (explaining corrective justice approach and noting that combining
right to compensation with duty of polluter to restore creates notion of social responsibility
within corrective justice theory).
338. See id. at 374 (expressing approval of restoration costs as primary measure of
damages because primary purposes of OPA and CERCLA are compensatory).
339 See id. at 371-73 (explaining corrective justice as promoting accountability and
social responsibility).
340. See id. at 372 (discussing combination of public's right of compensation with
polluter's duty to repair in order to create social responsibility).
341. See id. at 372-73 (discussing ability of corrective justice theory to restore "moral
balance").
342. See id. (noting that corrective justice largely removes consideration of and need
for distributive justice).
343. See id. at 372-74 (noting that NOAA and DOI now understand that purposes of
OPA and CERCLA are indicative of corrective justice theory); id. at 398-400 (explaining
that inclusion of nonuse values in natural resource valuation is step toward including totality
of ways people care for natural resources, but adding that efforts to quantify nonuse values
in economic terms is intuitively misplaced).
344. See A. at 378 (stating that two primary claims of corrective justice are presump-
tion that restoration costs are correct measure of damages and requirement that recovered
damages be spent to effect restoration).
1564
NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS
enlightened theory of natural resource values. First, the Final Rule intro-
duces the notion that polluters pay all damages in the "currency" of actual
natural resources.' 5 Not only are restoration costs the primary measure of
damages, but the new concept of compensatory restoration commands that
the polluter pay the public for interim diminution in value in the form of
added or improved natural resources.' By providing for compensation in
kind, NOAA is avoiding market valuation and market failure. 347
Second, the Final Rule avoids the reduction of natural resource values
to monetary terms at any stage m the scaling process.' Although previous
damage assessment regulations required trustees to include nonuse values
in natural resource valuation, those regulations focused on converting
nonuse values into economic terms.349 The inclusion of nonuse values is an
attempt to fully account for public value.350  However, by pricing nonuse
values through various market, nonmarket, and stated preference methods,
trustees resort to pricing norms and, consequently, lose at least part of the
public care that comprises the nonuse valuesY.35  The Final Rule, in con-
trast, seeks to establish a direct equilibrium between injured and replace-
ment resources and services and avoids the additional monetary step to link
the injury and its compensation. 2 When trustees must resort to a valuation
345. See Mazzotta et al., supra note 69, at 170-71 (explaining theory that resource-
based compensation is premised on determining relative value of resources with less
emphasis on monetary values).
346. See Final Rule, supra note 10, at 448 (explaining that compensatory restoration
is action to compensate for interim loss in value with additional resources or services).
347 See Mazzotta et al., supra note 69, at 167 (explaining that resource-based compen-
sation is based on finding level of resource that will put public well-being at same level
before and after natural resource injury); Williams, supra note 42, at 486-90 (developing
theory of "comprehensive restoration" in place of pricing rhetoric's compensable value).
Professor Williams endorses a comprehensive restoration scheme as consistent with the
purposes of CERCLA and OPA and the goals of corrective justice theory. d.
348. See supra notes 268-76 and accompanying text (discussing hierarchy of assessment
methods with contingent valuation and monetization at bottom of hierarchy in Final Rule).
349. See Williams, supra note 42, at 400-03 (noting that attempts to monetize nonuse
values are misplaced).
350. See Ohio v United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 464 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (noting that passive use values represent utility derived by humans and ought to be
included in damage assessments).
351. See Williams, supra note 42, at 402-03 (noting failure of recognized methods to
gauge nonuse values inherent in setting up hypothetical markets).
352. See Mazzotta et al., supra note 69, at 167-68 (explaining that resource-based com-
pensation has no link to monetary aspects of lost services). But see Williams, supra note
42, at 413-14 (noting that undue focus on services produced by injured resource "shifts the
focus of the damages remedy dramatically away from the principles of corrective justice").
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method, they may do so in units of actual resources.353 Contingent valua-
tion is the typical hypothetical market method that conforms with the
pricing theory; however, NOAA has modified its use in the Final Rule.
NOAA envisions natural resource trustees using contingent valuation
surveys to ask respondents to match replacement resources with lost re-
sources, rather than to place a dollar value on the lost resource.' In the
Final Rule, the calculation of the monetary values of injured and replace-
ment resources is a last resort.355
Finally, the Final Rule further implements the social responsibility
notion of the corrective justice view of natural resource valuation. NOAA
promotes increased polluter involvement by requiring trustees to invite
responsible parties to participate in the assessment process at an early
stage.356 In addition, responsible parties can suggest assessment procedures
that trustees will use throughout the damage assessment.35  When the
assessment procedure is complete, the responsible parties have the option
of implementing the restoration action themselves instead of simply paying
the trustees the costs of performing the restoration. 35  Thus, the polluters
can act as a type of general contractor hiring subcontractors to rebuild the
injured environment. In contrast to previous damage assessment regula-
tions, the Final Rule ensures that restoration will actually be implemented
and that the public will receive the full value that the polluter pays. 9 This
is a major step toward the realization of the true value of natural resources
353. See Final Rule, supra note 10, at 453 (explaining that trustees may use natural
resource services as units of exchange in valuation approach and detailing conditions when
trustees may resort to calculating monetary value).
354. See supra note 304 (quoting passage from Final Rule concerning differences m
new implementation of contingent valuation based on equivalencies of resources rather than
monetization of losses).
355. See Final Rule, supra note 10, at 453 (permitting trustees to calculate dollar value
of injured resource and select scale of replacement resources with same value if service-to-
service method cannot be performed within reasonable time or at reasonable cost).
356. See id. at 501 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.14(c)(2)) (stating that trus-
tees must invite responsible parties to participate in assessment no later than delivery of
Notice of Intent to Conduct Restoration Planning, which is before injury quantification
begins).
357 See id. (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.14(c)(6)) (allowing responsible parties
to request assessment procedures other than those selected by trustees).
358. See id. at 509 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.62(b)) (allowing responsible
parties to implement restoration plans).
359. See Stewart et al., supra note 22, at 163 (noting that under prior regulations literal
compliance with statutory requirement that all damages be spent on restoration has not been
accomplished, partly due to lack of guidance from governing statutes and regulations).
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and maximization of social welfare within a system that shuns economic
pricing.36
This movement toward corrective justice theory can explain both
NOAA's subordination of economic efficiency and avoidance of the contro-
versy associated with contingent valuation.36' In a corrective justice model,
economic efficiency is correctly subordinated to effective restoration of the
environment. The focus shifts from what economists say the public has lost
to what scientists say the environment has lost - from what society expects
from the environment to what the environment offers society.362 Thus,
economic tactics for monetizing individual preferences are largely irrelevant
and the subjugation of contingent valuation to resource equivalencies is
understandable.363 However, the goal of efficiency is not lost within
NOAA's corrective justice bent. For example, the Final Rule mandates that
trustees evaluate more costly assessment procedures in relation to the
additional information the increased cost will produce.3" In the corrective
justice context, a cost-benefit analysis at the restoration selection stage
would amount to a nonsensical attempt to align "qualitatively distinct goods
along a single metric."3" It would be futile to equate the benefits of an
improved environment and the monetary figure demanded from the respon-
sible party The corrective justice theory explains the movement of cost-
benefit considerations from the restoration selection phase to the procedure
selection phase.3" By ensuring that trustees use damage assessment proce-
360. See d. (explaining that literal compliance with statutory mandate to spend damages
on environment is difficult because of ambiguous guidance and lack of constraints in NRDA
regulation).
361. See supra notes 230-314 and accompanying text (discussing subordination of
economic efficiency concerns and avoidance of nonuse values and contingent valuation in
NOAA's Final Rule).
362. See Williams, supra note 42, at 467-74 (explaining that, in pricing rhetoric,
economists concentrate on mjury to individuals rather than on injury to environment, but
supply-side approach that focuses on redressing injury to environment is appropriate under
corrective justice theory).
363. See id. at 472 (arguing that it is nonsensical to rely on uninformed public to place
dollar value on damaged resources). Williams makes the following descriptive analogy- "It
makes no sense to rely directly on the ill-informed members of the public to evaluate the
dollar value of such environmental damage than it would be to rely on an ill-informed public
to choose between alternative designs for airplanes or alternative designs for nuclear power
plants." Id.
364. Final Rule, supra note 10, at 503 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 990.27(a)(2)).
365. Sunstem, supra note 315, at 860.
366. See supra notes 240-52 and accompanying text (explaining that only cost-benefit
consideration in Final Rule occurs at procedure selection as opposed to preferred restoration
plan selection as in previous rules).
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dures that are cost effective and produce information relative to their cost,
one eye is kept on economic efficiency considerations.
V Observations and Conclusions
It is easy to view the evolution of natural resource damage assessment
regulations as a haphazard trial and error process. DOI and NOAA gradu-
ally encountered problems in accounting for the true value of natural
resources and ariving at economically efficient damage amounts while still
making the public whole. In that regard, the Final Rule is another attempt
to solve those problems. NOAA has recognized the pitfalls m "valuing"
natural resources and has promulgated regulations that shun monetization
of the public's loss. The Final Rule accepts the view that the public can
only be compensated in the form of natural resources. Part of this latest
attempt to solve valuation problems is to marginalize the controversial
valuation techniques that reduce the value of resources to a unitary metric.
The consequence of this solution is that the Final Rule elevates concerns
about effectively making the environment whole over traditional concerns
about economic efficiency
On the other hand, it may be more appropriate to view the series of
proposed and final rules as a progression from an econonuc pricing theory
of damages toward a theory recognizing a plurality of irreducible values of
natural resources. Three fundamental "rethinkings" of natural resource
damage theory represent the major events in this regulatory progression.
All three rethrnkings gradually move away from reducing natural resource
values to economic terms and toward recognizing the variety of ways that
the public values the environment. The result is an emerging social respon-
sibility ideal. First, the Ohio court recognized that the polluters should
compensate the public for the injury to natural resources, as nonfungible
goods, by restoring the resource to its pre-injury condition. Ohio legiti-
mized the idea that nonuse values are real and that the public cannot be
made whole unless trustees account for them. Thus, the court tried to find
a true measure of the value of natural resources and pronounced that the
best way to compensate the public for that value is in kind.367 The second
rethinking of natural resource damage theory was the enactment of OPA in
1990. OPA codified the popular opinion that natural resource trustees
should measure damages as the public's interim loss of value in addition to
367 The true "rethinking" of theory revealed in Ohio occurred in the drafting of
CERCLA. The Ohio court was only effectuating the dormant congressional intent behind
CERCLA and that case is actually a delayed recognition of the true rethinking that occurred
in Congress.
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the cost of restoring the environment. In addition, OPA furthers the theme
of social responsibility by directing that trustees actually implement the
restoration plans on which damages were based. Until recently, however,
the Ohio court and NOAA thought of interim diminution in value as a
monetized component of damages.
Finally, perhaps the most fundamental rethinking of damage assessment
theory is NOAA's 1996 Final Rule. The Final Rule recognizes that, in
addition to restoration costs, polluters must compensate the public for inter-
im diminution in value in the form of actual resources. NOAA further
enhanced the social responsibility theme by offering responsible parties
early involvement, the opportunity to request assessment procedures, and
the ability to actually inplement the two-pronged restoration. In the short
run, NOAA may sacrifice traditional notions of economic efficiency in
order to further a long-term social responsibility norm.
As concerned citizens, we care about how our government values
injuries to natural resources because we want Moonstone Beach to exist in
its naturally pristine condition and, at the same time, we want household
heating oil to be delivered to New England in January 368 We accept the
fact that the demand for certain commodities, oil being the most obvious,
may threaten the condition of our environment. Although efforts to redirect
demand and safeguard against environmental accidents are on the rise, few
expect that we can completely eliminate all injuries to natural resources.
Thus, we search for an equilibrium between our conflicting and competing
desires. NOAA has recognized that this equilibrium cannot be a purely
economic one. While our desire for commercial activity may be reducible
to economic terms, our desire to avoid environmental degradation is not.
We must account for moral and social values, as well as economic prices,
to create a true equilibrium. Often, effective environmental public policy
is not about collecting money
368. See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text (discussing oil spill m Block Island
Sound m January of 1996).
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